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ABSTRACT 
  
Data from a total of 282 online web applications was collected, and accounts for 230 of 
those web applications were created in order to gather data about authentication practices, 
multistep authentication practices, security question practices, fallback authentication practices, 
and other security practices for online accounts. The account creation and data collection was 
done between June 2016 and April 2017. The password strengths for online accounts were 
analyzed and password strength data was compared to existing data. Security questions used by 
online accounts were evaluated for security and usability, and fallback authentication practices 
were assessed based on their adherence to best practices. Alternative authentication schemes 
were examined, and other security considerations such as use of HTTPS and CAPTCHAs were 
explored. Based on existing data, password policies require stronger passwords in for web 
applications in 2017 compared to the requirements in 2010. Nevertheless, password policies for 
many accounts are still not adequate. About a quarter of online web applications examined use 
security questions, and many of the questions have usability and security concerns. Security 
mechanisms such as HTTPS and continuous authentication are in general not used in 
conjunction with security questions for most web applications, which reduces the overall security 
of the web application. A majority of web applications use email addresses as the login credential 
and the password recovery credential and do not follow best practices. About a quarter of 
accounts use multistep authentication and a quarter of accounts employ continuous 
authentication, yet most accounts fail to combine security measures for defense in depth. The 
overall conclusion is that some online web applications are using secure practices; however, a 
majority of online web applications fail to properly implement and utilize secure practices. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Web services and applications are increasingly popular with users of the internet, and 
this popularity creates a drive for personalized experiences for users. This is reinforced by the 
fact that social media services like Facebook and LinkedIn provide a platform to represent a 
person’s identity online, which can reflect various aspects of their physical identity. Consequently, 
a user’s account can hold sensitive or valuable information that they may not want to be 
accessible to others. Hence, there is a need to secure web applications against improper access, 
which includes establishing account credentials that could be effectively and securely used to 
authenticate users.  
However, there exists a perception that online web applications do not have adequate 
security. Over the past 17 years, there have been over 200 major data breaches for online 
accounts. Even well-known web services such as Yahoo!, Gmail, and Twitter have had data 
breaches in the last 7 years (Pagliery, 2013). The consequences of the breaches range from a 
few 100,000 accounts compromised by attackers to a few million compromised accounts, which 
often included financial information such as credit card numbers. Some of these attacks involve 
retrieving an offline copy of the database with users’ hashed passwords and launching a brute-
force password cracking attack. While these large-scale attacks are not against individual 
accounts, it is important to understand the security of authentication practices for individual 
accounts. In fact, stronger authentication mechanisms not only can protect against targeted 
attacks, but also can reduce the effects of large-scale breaches by using stronger passwords, 
continuous authentication, and multistep authentication. A major issue with authentication 
practices is that there have been documented problems with their implementation. 
For example, as of this work, the most common method for web accounts to identify and 
login users, also called primary authentication, is the username and password scheme (Florencio 
& Herley, 2010). Passwords are notorious for having issues with usability (Adams & Sasse, 
1999). Users tend to choose insecure passwords that are easier to remember (Florencio & 
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Herley, 2007). The passwords that are the easiest to use are typically weak. Passwords with 
common sequences of numbers and digits or that use dictionary words can be brute forced using 
programs such as John the Ripper (n.d). Making passwords stronger typically requires making 
the password more complex, which can make it more difficult for the user to remember their 
passwords. Even if users employ strong passwords, it is common for users to reuse the same 
password for multiple web services (Florencio & Herley, 2007). Therefore, if an attacker discovers 
the password for one web service, the attacker can then breach other web services where that 
same password is used. These considerations suggest that, overall, passwords have a poor 
balance of usability and security. 
Another problem arises if a user forgets their credentials for primary authentication. The 
user can recover access to their account in a process called fallback authentication. One method 
that web services have used to authenticate a user during fallback authentication is via registered 
personal questions also known as security questions. Unfortunately, there have been 
documented problems with the implementation of security questions (Haga & Zviran, 1991). 
Depending on the type of security question chosen, the answer set can be small and therefore 
easily guessable. Other questions such as “What is your mother’s maiden name?” can be 
researched using public data or answered by an attacker who is a close friend or family member 
to the user (Griffith & Jakobsson, 2005). If the web service only requires a small number of 
security questions to regain access to the account and the questions are guessable, then an 
attacker can easily gain access to the user’s account as was the case in 2008 when vice 
presidential candidate Sarah Palin had her Yahoo! account compromised (Johnson, 2010). 
While existing literature indicates that security practices that can be used for 
authentication and password recovery are not secure, the question that can be raised is the 
following: What is the current level of security for security practices that are actually used by web 
applications today? Existing works have not provided large-scale, empirical data that measures 
the degree of security for these practices that are currently implemented. Therefore, the main 
question that our work aims to answer is the following: How adequate are the security practices 
used by web applications for the purpose of protecting user accounts? 
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Problem 
Our goal was to analyze the security practices implemented for various online web 
application in various categories. Specifically, we examine the types of authentication 
mechanisms for each account including the strength of their password policies, multistep 
practices, and continuous authentication mechanisms. In addition, we assess the implementation 
of fallback authentication for each account, especially the usage of security questions 
implemented by online web applications in practice. Finally, we use data about the other security 
mechanisms for each account to assess the combination of the security mechanisms with primary 
authentication, fallback authentication, and security question practices. 
Existing research and literature has addressed some of these areas; however, the 
existing works were on smaller scales and focused on specific domains. Herley and Florencio 
(2010) examined the password policies for 75 online web applications in 2010. Their work 
examined a smaller number of web applications and made some assumptions about the value of 
web applications that may not reflect their actual value, such as assuming that university 
accounts do not hold as much value as financial accounts. Researchers such as Schechter et al. 
(2009) and Rabkin (2008) examined security questions; however, they limited their research to 
specific domain such as email providers and banks, respectively, and did not examine the use of 
a combination of security mechanisms, which can improve the overall security of security 
questions. 
Our research addresses these gaps by gathering data for 282 online web applications. 
We created accounts for 230 allowing us to directly gather data about the policies as they are 
implemented. For the remaining accounts, we gathered data directly from policies without 
creating accounts due to the difficulty or impracticality of creating some accounts such as 
accounts with various banks or accounts at various universities. For all 282 applications, we 
examined the collected and posted password policies and analyzed their strength. We went a 
step further by comparing the strength of password policies for the online applications gathered 
by Herley and Florencio in 2010 to the strength of the password policies for those same accounts 
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in 2017. By comparing the results, we can report the evolution of password requirements for 
online web applications. Beyond passwords, we examine multistep authentication mechanisms 
and continuous authentication mechanisms. In order to more effectively evaluate the security of 
the authentication mechanisms for each account, we not only considered the password strength, 
but we also took into consideration any requirement on the use of other authentication 
mechanisms in addition to passwords.  
 Of the 282 online web applications, 79 used security questions in some manner, and we 
were able to collect security question data for 47 accounts. We classified the questions from the 
47 accounts into categories in order to assess their usability and resistance to attack. 
Furthermore, we examined and discussed the usage of security questions in practice. To bolster 
our analysis of the security of security questions, we examined the combination of the usage of 
security questions with the presence of multifactor authentication and usage of CAPTCHAs in 
order to determine the resistance of security questions to large-scale attacks. 
Our work also addresses the fallback authentication practices used by online web 
applications. Using recommended best practices from existing works, we assess the security of 
the fallback authentication mechanisms based on their adherence to the recommended practices. 
We went further by collecting and examining other security features offered by the accounts. With 
the data for password practices, multistep practices, continuous authentication, security 
questions, and fallback authentication, we determined how web application use a combination of 
mechanisms to increase their security or fail to take advantage of security mechanisms. By 
collecting data on whether accounts store sensitive information such as social security numbers 
and credit cards, we assessed whether storing information related to monetary value impacts the 
usage of security mechanisms.  
To our knowledge, no other work has performed an analysis of multiple security 
mechanisms for a large number of web applications. Hence, our work addresses the missing links 
for the usage and strength of multiple security practices for web applications. Our work can help 
identify poor implementations of security practices and allow us to recommend security practices 
for online accounts in order to help strengthen the security practices used on the web. 
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Summary of Results 
We summarize our results for each security practice. For password policies, we found 
that from the 2010 data for password policies, there is an increase in password strength in 2017 
for almost each web application category. Out of the seven hypotheses considered by Florencio 
and Herley, our results are different from theirs for three hypotheses. The differences in the 
results regarding the hypotheses also indicate that there is a strengthening of security 
requirements. 
For security questions, we found that about a quarter of web applications implemented 
security questions. However, a large portion of security questions in use are guessable or 
researchable and about a quarter of security questions have at least one characteristic that 
hampers their usability. Of the security questions analyzed, the best questions have specific 
format, have a large and clearly defined answer space, ask about a specific event or person in 
the past, have answers that are not contained in public records, and have answer spaces without 
popular answers that represent a majority of the population. Most online web applications do not 
use the security mechanism of HTTPS nor CAPTCHA in conjunction with security questions to 
improve the security of security questions. We found no relationship between usage of security 
questions and storage of financial information. 
Regarding fallback authentication, we found that many accounts rely on email as login 
credential and email for initiating and implementing password recovery, which emphasizes the 
need for security of email provider web applications. Our analysis indicates that few web 
applications follow best practices and that most web applications do not follow password recovery 
best practices or they implement insecure practices. 
We found that less than a quarter of online web applications use multistep verification, 
about half of web applications allow single-sign on, and over a quarter of web application 
implement continuous authentication. However, we found no relationship between single-sign on 
and storage of financial information and no relationship between continuous authentication and 
storage of financial information. Overall, our results suggest that most online web applications do 
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not follow best practices and do not effectively utilize security mechanisms nor use a combination 
of security practices to improve overall security. 
 
Outline of Thesis 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of existing 
work for the topics that are addressed in this thesis such as password, security questions, and 
fallback authentication. In Chapter 3, the methodology for gathering the data for online web 
applications is described. Chapter 4 describes the results of the password practice data gathered 
for the online web applications, the comparison of password policy data from 2017 to the 
password policy data in 2010, and the trends in password practices for online web applications. 
Chapter 5 describes the classification of security questions and the examination of security 
question practices. Chapter 6 discusses and evaluates fallback authentication practices for online 
web applications. Chapter 7 discusses the results for other security mechanisms related to 
authentication such as multistep authentication, single-sign on, and continuous authentication. 
Chapter 8 discusses the results of examining various security considerations for online web 
applications such as use of HTTPS and use of CAPTCHA. The conclusion and future 
improvements to this work are provided in Chapter 9.  
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CHAPTER 2 
RELATED WORK 
Primary Authentication 
There is a plethora of existing research on authentication mechanisms, especially on the 
usability and security of password schemes. One topic of concern is the burden placed on users 
when passwords are used for authentication. Adams and Sasse (1999) performed a study 
assessing how well participants remembered their passwords and discovered that users have 
more difficulty recalling their password as the password complexity increases. By examining the 
amount of time and number of attempts that participants needed in order create complex 
passwords and the password memorability, Vu et al. (2007) demonstrated that enforcing strict 
password requirements did not guarantee that users will select more secure passwords. For 
participants who had to remember five passwords, 25% of them were unable to recall at least 
one. This relates to the results from a survey by SafeNet (2005) indicating that 47% of 
respondents managed over 5 passwords and that 47% of respondents forgot at least one 
password per year. In terms of error tolerance, Brostoff and Sasse (2003) examined enforcing a 
threshold of three attempts for participants to correctly enter their password. Their results 
indicated that only 10% of users failed to login and that the failure rate could be reduced if the 
number of allowed attempts was increased to ten. The previous literature support some of the 
earliest recommendations by Zurko and Simon (1996). In their work, they recommended being 
aware of the security burden placed on users. In this context, security system designers should 
be aware of the memorability burdens that complex passwords place on users. 
One of the common themes from existing work is that users make poor security decisions 
with regards to passwords. Herley and Florencio (2007) examined password use and reuse for 
half a million users over a three-month period. The main results of their work indicated that the 
average password is reused at six distinct accounts, a user on average has about 25 accounts, 
and that users choose weak passwords. On a smaller scale, Gaw and Felton (2006) surveyed 
password usage by undergraduates. Their findings were that undergraduates had at most three 
passwords on average, reused passwords at least twice, and that they were more likely to reuse 
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passwords as they accumulated more accounts. Further promoting the idea that users make poor 
security decisions, Beautement et al. (2008) showed that users only have a limited amount 
attention that they are willing to allocate for security, which is based on the actual and perceived 
benefits and costs for adherence. Furthermore, Herley’s (2009) examination of security advice 
supports the idea that users perform a cost-benefit analysis when they consider following security 
advice, even when it involves ignoring advice for strong passwords. On a larger scale, Bonneau 
and Preibush (2010) performed an empirical analysis of password implementations for various 
accounts. They found that there were poor security practices with accounts with low security 
incentives yet accounts that stored sensitive information tended to have more password security. 
Likewise, Inglesant and Sasse (2010) examined password policies and practices in the 
workplace. Instead of focusing on the most secure policies, they advocated for security policies 
that are based on a human-computer interaction framework because users do consider security 
but many security protocols are incompatible with the user’s needs. 
In terms of the future of passwords, St. Clair et al. (2006) conducted an empirical study of 
password practices in order to determine the effectiveness of offline attacks. Their results suggest 
that many systems are vulnerable to offline attack and need to be made more secure against 
such attacks. On a similar note, the current usage of passwords and the reasons why password 
practices are still in place was performed by Herley et al. (2009). They cited diversity of 
requirements, competing proposals, scarcity of loss data, user reluctance and usability, no 
standardization, and individual control of end-user platforms as some of the reasons why 
passwords practices are still in use. For future improvement on password systems, Sasse et al. 
(2001) explored ways to improve user memorability and increase user adherence to security 
practices. Furthermore, Bellovin (2008) recommends performing analysis on the security 
practices in order to decide which security practices should be implemented. 
In an attempt to address the security problems associated with textual passwords, 
several other primary authentication schemes have been proposed. Dhamija and Perrig (2000) 
proposed an image based authentication scheme that works by authenticating users based on 
their ability to recognize previously observed images. Their proposed solution achieved a 90% 
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authentication rate compared to the 70% authentication rate for passwords and PINs, which 
indicates that their proposed method is reliable and memorable relative to passwords. Using a 
similar scheme, Jermyn et al. (1999) formulated a graphical password mechanism that utilizes 
spatial position and temporal order in order to increase the graphical password answer space. 
Rather than using one static password for primary authentication, Herley and Florencio (2006) as 
well as Haller (1994) performed research on one-time password authentication systems used as 
potentially viable authentication schemes. 
The security of passwords can be improved by combining them with another type of 
authentication mechanism, which is called multifactor authentication. Multifactor authentication is 
a scheme where two different types of authentication information used in order to authenticate a 
user. The types considered by two-factor authentication are proof of knowledge of a secret, proof 
of possession of a physical token, and proof of possession of physical characteristics 
(biometrics), There are several web applications that already offer two-factor authentication, 
which spawned the creation of the two-factor.org project that documents a partial list of web 
accounts that offer two-factor authentication (Davis, 2017). One common method of multifactor 
authentication is the combination of passwords with one-time passwords sent to mobile phones. 
Tiwari et al. (2011) proposed a multifactor mechanism using a transaction ID code and SMS. A 
major issue about using phones as an implementation of multifactor authentication is the fact that 
phone numbers change and phones are often lost or are not operable everywhere. According to 
Consumer Reports, about 2.1 million American had their phones stolen in 2014 compared to 3.1 
million Americans having their phones stolen in 2013 (“Smartphone thefts drop as kill switch 
usage grows But Android users are still waiting for the technology”, 2015).  
The most relevant related work to this thesis was the work by Herley and Florencio 
(2010) concerning the password policies for online web applications. They examined the 
password policies for 75 online accounts for categories including the top traffic web accounts, 
banks, and top universities. Their results indicate that presence of brute force attacks, higher user 
traffic, and extractable value of the accounts do not correlate with stronger password policies; 
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however, competition for user traffic and making a profit from advertisements correlate with 
weaker password policies. 
 
Security Questions 
Overall, many of the of the works that examine security questions focus on a specific 
area such as banking or user-written questions. One of the earliest examinations of security 
questions was performed by Haga and Zviran (1991). They analyzed the memorability and 
guessability of cognitive (i.e., based on user opinions, interests, and biography) and associative 
(i.e., based on word or concept association) security questions and found that family members 
could correctly answer 60% of fact-based security questions, spouses could answer 41% of fact-
based security questions, and friends could answer 23.5% of fact-based security questions. In 
order to assess the security questions used in practice, Rabkin (2008) surveyed the security 
questions used by various bank accounts. Their major findings include that banks do not provide 
guidance for security questions and many of the questions are not considered strong due to being 
guessable or researchable. Similarly, the memorability and security of security questions 
employed by major email providers were analyzed by Schechter et al. (2009). According to their 
results, 75% of participants could recall their answer and 76% of participants who could recall 
their answer did so within five attempts, however, the security questions proposed by email 
providers and user written questions were weak due to guessability.  
Numerous researchers including Podd et al. (1996) and Zviran and Haga (1991) 
performed research on the guessability of security questions by significant others. Podd et al. 
(1996) also examined the recall rate for various security questions and showed that 77% of 
participants could recall their security question answers. Another security aspect for security 
questions addressed by Griffith and Jakobsson (2008) was whether the security questions could 
be answered from information available publicly. One of their main findings was that security 
questions such as “What is your mother’s maiden name?” can be derived by an attacker with 
reasonable probability. One of the main issues with security questions is answering the question 
in the same format and spelling as established during security question registration. Both Ellison 
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et al. (2000) and Frykholm and Juels (2001) explored tolerating errors for incorrectly answered 
security questions. Their methods involve tolerating errors by requiring a threshold of questions to 
be correctly answered before a user was authenticated. 
Toomin et al. (2008) also examined user written questions but focused on social access 
control for social groups enforced by answering a question based on shared information. Based 
on their user survey, they showed that the participants chose questions that could be 
authenticated by members of their social groups yet were only correctly guessed by at attacker 
11% of the time given ten guesses. In an effort to analyze questions chosen by users, Just and 
Aspinall (2009), measured usability and guessability of user-written questions. Their work showed 
that user-chosen questions had individually low entropy, but a majority of users chose a 
combined set of three questions that were less susceptible to guessability and observability. 
Hence, they suggested combining security questions with other techniques and requiring a 
subset of questions to be answered in order to improve their security.  
An alternative scheme for security questions proposed by Jakobsson et al. (2008) 
involves questions based on user’s preferences on a specific topic. In order for this scheme to 
have tolerable error rates, a large set of security questions must be set up and a fairly large 
subset of 16 questions must be answered at authentication time. O’Gorman et al. (2004) 
developed preference based security questions using a protocol called Query Directed 
Passwords (QDP) and found that the scheme provided reasonable security. Rather than having 
security questions that are likely researchable using public information, QDP asks numerous 
questions about trivial facts and opinions. In a slightly different vein, instead of registering security 
questions, Asgharpour et al. (2007) experimented with a scheme where users answer questions 
about their browser history. 
The most thorough classification of security questions was performed by Just (2004) 
where he defined the security and usability categories for security questions. His security 
question metrics have been the basis for the categories used by other researches such as Rabkin 
(2008). Just (2004) divided security question attributes into three classes: usability, security, and 
privacy. In terms of usability, he defined the criteria as applicability, memorability, and reliability. 
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He separated security criteria into two parts: observability and guessability. Just (2004) defined 
the privacy criteria as collection limitation and use limitation. In addition to his security categories, 
Just provided recommendations for improving security questions. Beyond research papers, the 
Canadian government posted recommended practices for security questions (“Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner of Canada”, 2006). 
 
Fallback Authentication 
In terms of fallback authentication, there is research on the different types of methods of 
fallback authentication. Reeder and Schechter (2011) defined and evaluated the numerous 
fallback authentication methods that can be used in practice and then recommended best 
practices for each mechanism. Focusing on fallback authentication, Just (2004) also discusses 
the types of authentication that can be used for fallback authentication with a focus on security 
questions. Similarly, Kluecker (2013) provides an overview of fallback authentication mechanisms 
and then analyzes each approach in terms of usability and security. As an alternative method for 
fallback authentication, the social authentication method of using trustees was proposed by 
Schechter et al. (2009, April). This authentication method involves a user registering several other 
users as “trusted users for password recovery” or trustees. A threshold number of three trustees 
must successfully respond with an emailed code after being contacted by the user in order for the 
user to recover their password. The scheme had promising results because 89% of participants 
were able to contact their trustees; however, 72% of participants had to be reminded of their 
trustees in order to complete the process. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
We created accounts and gathered data for web applications from different categories 
between June 2016 to April 2017. The data was further validated between January and April 
2017. In order to properly evaluate the security practices for each web application, we created 
and registered 230 web accounts out of 282 web applications observed. In some cases, we were 
not able to create accounts for applications such as banks, insurance companies, and 
universities. However, we used publicly available information to record data on the password 
policies, multistep authentication options, and password recovery methods for accounts where we 
could not register for an account. In order to collect data for the web applications with high user 
traffic, we referred to the top traffic websites for different categories using Alexa 
(www.alexa.com). Alexa is a web application that provides statistics on commercial web traffic 
data. The results provided by Alexa are considered in the research community to be reasonable 
for representing the top traffic websites for various categories. We collected account data for the 
following categories defined by Alexa: 
• top earning websites, 
• top art websites, 
• top business websites, 
• top computer websites, 
• top gaming websites, 
• top health websites, 
• top home websites, 
• top kids and teens sites, 
• top news websites, 
• top recreation websites, 
• top reference websites, 
• top regional websites, and 
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• top shopping websites. 
We note that Alexa did not provide a description or definition for these categories, While 
some categories are self-evident such as computer websites and gaming websites, but some 
categories are vague such as home websites. In addition, any website listed by Alexa could fall 
into multiple categories so each Alexa category does not have a unique set of websites. For each 
web application in our data set, we collected the following data:  
• information required for user registration, 
• password policies, 
• types of multistep authentication mechanisms offered, 
• types of continuous authentication available, 
• types of single-sign on available 
• the process for password recovery, 
• the security features explicitly offered by the account, 
• the login and password recovery credentials, 
• the types of financial information that can be stored on the account. 
 
User Registration Data Collection 
When creating an account, we documented the account name and its URL. Each input 
field on the registration page was recorded. The most common fields documented include name, 
address, phone, email, username, social security number, CAPTCHA, terms and conditions, and 
privacy policy. If an account allowed certain credentials to be verified, we would verify the 
credential and record whether the verification was mandatory for registration.  
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Password Policy Data Collection 
We recorded the password policy for as many of the web applications as possible. If we 
had the ability to register for an account, we created the account and recorded the posted 
password policy in the registration page. Next, we attempted to submit the weakest password 
based on the posted password policy in order to determine whether the password policy was 
properly enforced. For example, if the password policy only specifies a minimum password length 
and the minimum length is 8, then the password 11111111 was submitted in order to see if it 
would be accepted. In order to confirm that the password policy was consistent throughout the 
web application, we recorded the password policy for the change password page and the 
password reset page. The web applications with inconsistent password policies were 
documented. If we were unable to register for an account, we used officially and publicly posted 
password policies. One drawback of relying only on the posted password policies was that it 
prevented us from determining if the password policies were enforced. 
 
Alternative Authentication Mechanisms Data Collection 
We collected data regarding whether the web applications implemented multistep 
authentication and the types of multistep authentication offered for each web application. Unlike 
multifactor authentication, multistep authentication allows two authentication credentials from the 
same category; therefore, multifactor authentication is a type of multistep authentication. For 
accounts that we could create, we searched the account settings and official account help 
documentation to determine whether multistep authentication can be enabled. We recorded 
information about whether any type of multistep authentication was available and the types of 
multistep authentication that were available such as using a mobile phone one-time password or 
using a hardware token. In order to test the multistep authentication options, we configured 
multistep authentication where we had the resources to configure the option (e.g., phone, email, 
and backup codes but not hardware tokens). For the accounts that we could not create, we 
documented the publicly posted information on their multistep and multifactor authentication 
policy. 
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Additionally, we collected data about each web application’s usage of single-sign on. We 
recorded whether an account utilized another system’s login mechanism such as Facebook or 
Google for their own authentication system. We documented all the possible single-sign on 
providers for each web application. 
 
Security Question Data Collection 
We recorded whether web applications implemented security questions and what security 
questions were used by each web application. We recorded whether web applications prompted 
users to setup security questions. The main fields recorded for security questions were the 
minimum number of required security questions, the maximum number of security questions, the 
types of security questions required, whether the answers were visible on the account page, 
whether the answers are visible when answering security questions, and the type of security 
mechanisms that used security questions. If a web application made the set of possible security 
questions available publicly, we documented the pool of security questions. For each security 
question, the type of security question and the type of answer format were recorded. In addition, 
we examined whether security questions could be edited and if the same security questions were 
used for different security mechanisms. If we could not create an account and had no access to 
the content of the questions asked, we used publicly posted information in order to determine 
whether a web application implemented security questions in some fashion. For example, a web 
application’s help page may mention a step that involves security questions for fallback 
authentication or may recommend updating their security question periodically. 
 
Fallback Authentication Data Collection 
We were able to create accounts for 230 web applications. For each of those accounts, 
we documented the password recovery process. First, we recorded the types of password 
recovery options that were available. Next, we initiated password recovery for online recovery 
options and noted the credentials that were necessary to initiate password recovery. The types of 
password recovery include Help Desk Recovery, In Person Recovery, Text Temporary Password 
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Recovery, Personal Info Password Recovery, Call Mobile OTP Recovery, Phone OTP Recovery, 
Email Link Recovery, Email New Password Recovery, and Email Current Password Recovery. 
We documented the steps necessary to complete password recovery and data relevant for 
evaluating the web application’s adherence to best practices such as logging out active sessions 
after successful recover and whether a web application locked a user out of their account after 
password recovery was initiated. If email link recovery was used, we recorded the validity period 
for the link if available. In addition, whether CAPTCHAs were utilized in password recovery and 
whether one time passwords were used in conjunction to other methods like emailing a password 
recovery link were documented.  
 
Security Feature Data Collection 
In order to assess the security of the web applications in terms of their security features, 
we documented the implemented security mechanisms that each web application employed. One 
security feature that we investigated was the presence of HTTPS. We recorded the availability of 
HTTPS prior to login, during registration, during login, and after login for each web application. 
Prior to registration, we visited the home page and a few linked pages on the web application. 
Using the Google Chrome browser’s URL bar, we recorded whether the web application used 
HTTPS, or an EV Green Bar HTTPS prior to being logged into the application. For the account 
registration page and login page, the type of HTTPS used was documented, if any. After login, we 
recorded the type of HTTPS present in various pages including the account, profile, and settings 
pages. However, one limitation was that we did not examine HTTPS network traffic to determine 
all requests used HTTPS until the final redirect occurred. Thus, a web application may seem to 
use HTTPS but not all redirects have HTTPS enabled, yet we assume that this case is unlikely. 
After the account creation, we documented the presence of other security features that 
could be enabled on the account. The following are the security feature categories documented: 
One-Time Password (OTP) to Access Account, Login Again to Access Account, Challenge 
Response for Anomalous Behavior, Ability to Add Public Key, Trustee System for Fallback 
Authentication, Permission Management, Authorized Users, Trusted Devices, Backup Codes, 
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Manage App Access, Manage Third Party Application Access, White List of IP Addresses, 
Session Management, Multiple Tabs Allowed for Same Session, CAPTCHA During Login, Email 
or Phone OTP for Unrecognized Browser, Security Question for Account Changes, Max 
Consecutive Reset Attempts, and Max Consecutive Login Attempts. 
Another feature for which we gathered data was the ability to delete the account from the 
account’s user interface. After an account was created, we searched the user interface for a 
method to delete the account from the account interface. Since the delete option was not always 
easily found on the interface, we referred to help documentation for the process of deleting an 
account. It is important to note that we did not record whether an account could be deleted by 
contacting customer support if it was not explicitly described as a valid option by the account 
interface or the help documentation. We did not attempt to complete the delete account process 
as we wanted to keep access to account in case data verification was needed. 
 
Financial Information Data Collection 
One of the metrics for assessing the value of an account was by determining whether an 
account stored forms of financial information such as credit cards, bank information, or links to 
PayPal accounts. For each account, we documented whether credit cards, debit cards, bank 
accounts, PayPal account links, and Bitcoins could be stored on the account. In order to assess 
whether attackers could redirect physical packages, we documented whether shipping, mailing, 
and billing addresses could be stored on the account. Next, we attempted to change the 
addresses and recorded whether we could do so successfully in order to determine whether an 
attacker could do so if they compromised the account. 
 
Identity Credential Modification Collection 
In order to assess the usable security of the account, we gathered data concerning the 
ability to change the identity credentials. By having the ability to change the identity credentials 
for login, if an attacker manages to gain access to the account, the user could change the login 
credential in order to deny the attacker access, but the attacker could also change the login 
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credential in order to deny the user access to the account. In addition, the ability to change the 
identity credential for password recovery grants the user the ability to regain access to their 
account if the original recovery credential is inaccessible. During account registration, we 
recorded the login identity credential for the account. In addition, we documented the password 
recovery identity credential needed to initiation password recovery such as username. Next, the 
ability to change the login identity credential and password recovery credential were documented. 
If the identity credential involved an external communication medium such as email or phone, we 
recorded whether the credential could be verified and whether it was required to be verified 
before it could be officially modified. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PASSWORD PRACTICES 
We measured the strength of the password based on the password requirements for 274 
out of the 282 total accounts examined. Password policy data could not be gathered for seven of 
the accounts due to reasons such as the account had no publicly posted password policy or the 
system only allowed system created passwords. Out of 230 accounts, only one did not use 
passwords because it allowed many different university login mechanisms to gain access to an 
account. The strength of a password is dependent on the complexity of the password. Complexity 
is often measured by resistance to brute force attacks, which implies that passwords should be 
long and have a large character set to increase the computation power and time needed for a 
brute force attack to be successful. Therefore, a 12-character password with lowercase, 
uppercase, and digits has more complexity and thus more strength than a password with four 
digits.  
For the password strength, we calculate the password entropy assuming that all 
passwords of minimum length are equally likely and only passwords of minimum length are 
chosen. The entropy is given by l*log2(c), where l is the minimum password length and c is 
character set cardinality. As Herley and Florencio (2010) note, this measurement only 
approximates the resistance of the password to a brute force attack. They reinforce this concept 
by explaining that a 34-bit password like “aIRKzO” could be more resistant to brute force attacks 
than 66-bit password “Let_Me_In!” since the later uses common English words. However, absent 
other information about how users choose passwords, this measurement gives an approximation 
of password strength for password chosen by a careful user or by a password manager. Also, this 
measurement allows us to compare the data from 2017 to their data from 2010. 
As described in Chapter 2, we collected account information for web applications in 
categories defined by Alexa, but Alexa did not provide a meaningful description for each category 
that they used nor do they justify why or how they categorize a website into a specific category. In 
order to provide more meaningful categories for web applications, we group the web applications 
into the following categories:  
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• Airlines, 
• Banks and Brokerages,  
• College,  
• Computer, 
• Educational,  
• Email Providers,  
• Entertainment,  
• Gaming,  
• Government,  
• Health,  
• Hotels and Motels,  
• Insurance,  
• News and Journalism,  
• Online Shopping,  
• Real Estate,  
• Research,  
• Restaurants,  
• Social Media,  
• Software Service Provider, and 
• Travel.  
Using the overall data set and the groupings, we analyze the median password policy 
strength and average password strength for each grouping. 
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Password Policies 
Table 1 
Password Strength Statistics per Category for 274 Accounts 
Category 
Median 
Password 
Strength 
Average 
Password 
Strength 
Number of 
Accounts 
Percent 
Government 49.03426414 55.17180148 15 5.5% 
College 47.63357048 43.76181419 29 10.6% 
Email Provider 41.35940001 35.9593968 11 4.0% 
Banks and 
Brokerage 
31.01955001 35.65218826 12 4.4% 
Airline 28.20263831 35.26099865 11 4.0% 
Gaming 33.21928095 34.32685587 19 6.9% 
Hotels and 
Motels 
37.60351775 33.29323434 7 2.6% 
Software Service 
Provider 
28.20263831 32.51399701 14 5.1% 
Computer 26.57542476 32.15947037 9 3.3% 
Health 30.64548429 30.64548429 2 0.7% 
Restaurant 26.57542476 30.29014859 20 7.3% 
Online Shopping 26.57542476 28.15667288 43 15.7% 
News and 
Journalism 
19.93156857 24.39874673 19 6.9% 
Travel 26.57542476 23.43429817 9 3.3% 
Insurance 23.25349666 23.25349666 2 0.7% 
Education 19.93156857 21.48565524 5 1.8% 
Social Media 19.93156857 20.44263443 13 4.7% 
Research 19.93156857 19.93156857 1 0.4% 
Entertainment 19.93156857 19.68252362 28 10.2% 
Real Estate 4.700439718 12.4590829 5 1.8% 
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Table 2 
Password Bit Strength Statistics per Category for 229 Accounts 
Category Median Password 
Average 
Password 
Count Percent 
Government 48.86819565 51.82850981 9 3.9% 
College 48.52871352 48.52871352 1 0.4% 
Banks and 
Brokerages 
37.10449762 36.70506595 4 1.7% 
Email Providers 43.48145888 36.13507265 10 4.3% 
Airlines 28.20263831 35.26099865 11 4.8% 
Gaming 33.21928095 33.70009837 19 8.3% 
Hotels and 
Motels 
37.60351775 33.29323434 7 3.0% 
Software Service 
Provider 
28.20263831 32.51399701 14 6.1% 
Computer 26.57542476 32.15947037 9 3.9% 
Health 30.64548429 30.64548429 2 0.9% 
Restaurants 26.57542476 29.72413359 20 8.7% 
Online Shopping 26.57542476 28.2733202 43 18.7% 
Travel 26.57542476 23.43429817 9 3.9% 
News and 
Journalism 
19.93156857 22.40157396 19 8.3% 
Educational 19.93156857 21.48565524 5 2.2% 
Social Media 19.93156857 20.44263443 13 5.7% 
Entertainment 19.93156857 19.68252362 28 12.2% 
Real Estate 4.700439718 12.4590829 5 2.2% 
Research 9.965784285 9.965784285 2 0.9% 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show the password policy statistics for the 229 and 274 online accounts, 
respectively. Both tables indicate that the Government and College categories had the strongest 
password policies while real estate had the weakest password policies. In both tables, the Email 
Provider category had a relatively strong average password strength. 
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Figure 1. Password strength histogram for 274 web applications. 
 
Figure 1 shows a histogram of the bit strength of the password policies for 274 online 
accounts. About 60% of the online accounts have a password policy bit strength that is fewer 
than 35 bits. About 13% of the accounts have a bit strength between 35 and 45 bits. 
Approximately 25% of online accounts have a password policy strength of 45 bits or greater. 
 
 
Figure 2. Password strength histogram for 274 web applications by domain type. 
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Figure 3. Password strength histogram for 274 web applications by domain type. 
 
In Figures 2 and 3, the distribution of password strengths for each domain type is 
displayed. For .com accounts, 43% had a password policy strength of fewer than 25 bits, 29% 
had passwords strengths between 25 bits but fewer than 45 bits, and 28% had password 
strengths of 45 bits or greater. For .edu accounts, 0% had a password policy strength of fewer 
than 25 bits, 35% had passwords strengths between 25 and 45 bits, and 65% had password 
strengths of 45 bits or greater. For .gov accounts, 0% had a password policy strength of fewer 
than 25 bits, 8% had passwords strengths between 25 bits but fewer than 45 bits, and 92% had 
password strengths of 45 bits or greater. 
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Figure 4. Password Strength Histogram for 229 web applications. 
 
Figure 4 shows a histogram of the bit strength of the password policies for 229 online 
accounts. About 70% of the online accounts have a bit strength that is less than 35 bits. About 
13% of the accounts have a bit strength between 35 and 45 bits. Approximately 17% of online 
accounts have a password policy strength of 45 bits or greater. 
 
 
Figure 5. Password strength histogram for 229 web applications by domain type. 
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Figure 6. Password strength relative histogram for 229 web applications by domain type. 
 
In Figures 5 and 6, the distribution of password strengths by domain type is shown. For 
.com accounts, 46% had a password policy strength of fewer than 25 bits, 39% had passwords 
strengths between 25 bits but fewer than 45 bits, and 14% had password strengths of 45 bits or 
greater. For .edu accounts, we could not create more than one edu account so it was not 
meaningful to represent it in figures n and n. For .gov accounts, 0% had a password strength 
fewer than 25 bits, 0% had passwords strengths between 25 bits but fewer than 45 bits, and 
100% had password strengths of 45 bits or greater. 
During our data collection for the 230 created accounts, we came across some web 
applications that had inconsistent password policies. This means that the web applications posted 
conflicting requirements related to minimum password length, required characters, and allowed 
characters on the registration page, change password page, or reset password page. The 
following are the web applications with inconsistent password policies: 
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• Hotels.com, 
• IMDB, 
• iPhoto, 
• King, 
• Lenovo, 
• Netflix, 
• Open Table, 
• Orbitz, 
• Roblox, 
• Sonic Merchandise, 
• Thoth Lab, 
• Travelocity, 
• United Airlines, 
 
Comparison to Existing Data 
One of the main inspirations for our research was the examination of password practices 
by Herley and Florencio (2010). They recorded the password policies and calculated the 
password strength for 75 different online web applications for categories such as top traffic sites, 
high traffic site, medium traffic sites, banks and brokerages, large universities, top university 
computer science departments, and government. From this data set, they tested hypotheses that 
correlated password policy to various factors. The factors that they examined were presence of 
brute force attacks, the amount of traffic or number of registered users for the site, whether the 
username is public, the value of the resources protected, the extractable value of the resources 
protected, who faces the consequences of the breach, acceptance of advertisements, evidence 
of advertising, and user choice of the service. Based on the relevance of each hypothesis to our 
work, we tested a subset of their hypotheses.  
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In order to compare the changes in password policies for those accounts from 2010 to 
2017, we gathered password policy data for 70 of those 75 web applications. We could not gather 
data for five of the web applications because either those accounts no longer exist or no longer 
post their password policy publicly. We needed information related to user traffic ranking, number 
of registered users, asset value, whether an account accepts ads, top phished brands, and user 
choice for the accounts that were analyzed by Herley and Florencio. We were able to use web 
applications like QuantCast (https://www.quantcast.com) to collect information about traffic 
ranking, but we had to rely on other sources for information related to ad acceptance, top phished 
brands, number of registered users, and assets values. For data related to ad acceptance, we 
manually examined each site using an ad blocking software called AdBlock and attempted to 
determine whether an application accepted ads or not. 
 
Figure 7. Herley and Florencio password strength histogram for 75 online accounts in 2010. 
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Figure 8. Password strength histogram for 70 online accounts in 2017. 
Figures 7 and 8 show the distributions of password strengths from 2010 and 2017 
respectively. For Herley and Florencio’s data, 8% of accounts had a bit strength fewer than 15 
bits, 14% of accounts had a bit strength between 15 and 25 bits, 16% of accounts had a bit 
strength between 25 and 35 bits, 14% of accounts had a bit strength between 35 and 45 bits, 
19% of accounts had a bit strength between 45 and 55 bits, and 3% had password strength of 
greater than 55 bits. These results contrast with the data gathered from 2017, where 29% of 
accounts had a bit strength fewer than 15 bits, 0% of accounts had a bit strength between 15 and 
25 bits, 1% of accounts had a bit strength between 25 and 35 bits, 13% of accounts had a bit 
strength between 35 and 45 bits, 7% of accounts had a bit strength between 45 and 55 bits, and 
44% had password strength of greater than 55 bits. 
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Figure 9. Herley and Florencio password strength histogram by domain type. 
 
 
Figure 10. Password strength histogram by domain type in 2017. 
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accounts had a bit strength fewer than 25 bits, 20% of accounts had a bit strength between 25 
bits and 45 bits, and 80% of accounts had a bit strength of over 45 bits. Our data had different 
trends. For .com accounts over 26% of accounts had a bit strength fewer than 25 bits, 48% of 
accounts had a bit strength between 25 bits and 45 bits, and 26% of accounts had a bit strength 
of over 45 bits. For .edu accounts, 0% of accounts had a bit strength fewer than 25 bits, 24% of 
accounts had a bit strength between 25 bits and 45 bits, and 76% of accounts had a bit strength 
of over 45 bits. For .gov accounts, 0% of accounts had a bit strength fewer than 25 bits, 10% of 
accounts had a bit strength between 25 bits and 45 bits, and 90% of accounts had a bit strength 
of over 45 bits. 
 
Table 3 
Median Password Strengths Comparison between 2010 and 2017 
Account Group 
Median 
Password 
Strength 2010 
Median 
Password 
Strength 2017 
Herley and 
Florencio 
Number of 
Accounts 
Our Number of 
Accounts 
Top Traffic 19.9 26.6 15 14 
High Traffic 19.9 35.2 8 8 
Medium Traffic 8.3 28.1 8 6 
Banks and 
Brokerages 
31.0 31.0 9 8 
Large Univ. 44.5 47.6 10 10 
Top CS Dept. 46.4 50.1 10 10 
Government 47.6 51.3 10 10 
.com 19.9 26.6 41 37 
.edu 43.7 47.6 22 22 
.gov 47.6 49.1 12 12 
 
As Table 3 shows, we compared the median password strengths from 2010 to the 
password strengths in 2017 for the groupings defined by Herley and Florencio (2010). The 
column “Our Number of Accounts” shows that we were missing a total of four accounts from 
Herley and Florencio’s data. We included only one account for MIT but the 2010 data has two 
accounts for MIT and we were not able to get information on how the two accounts differ. There 
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was one account missing for the Top Traffic and Banks and Brokerages groupings and only two 
accounts missing from the Medium Traffic grouping. 
 
Table 4 
Registered Users for 5 Top User Sites and 5 Largest Universities in 2010 
Web Application Users Rank Min Strength 2010 
Facebook 400 million 2 19.9 
Yahoo 260 million 3 19.9 
Live 260 million 8 19.9 
Gmail 91 million 1 19.9 
Twitter 76 million 31 19.9 
Ohio State 51,800 1811 41.4 
ASU 51,200 3288 47.6 
University of 
Florida 
50,900 1382 47.6 
University of 
Minnesota 
50,400 919 35.7 
University of 
Texas 
49,000 946 47.6 
 
Table 5 
Registered User for 5 Top User Sites and 5 Largest Universities in 2017 
Web Application Users Rank Min Strength 2017 
Gmail 3+ billion 1 53.6 
Facebook 2+ billion 4 26.6 
Yahoo 1+ billion 6 46.0 
Live 400+ million 5 26.6 
Amazon 304+ million 8 19.9 
ASU 98,146 7086 49.5 
Ohio State 66,046 7247 43.4 
Texas A&M 66,426 2372 47.6 
University of 
Central Florida 
64,318 NA 32.6 
University of 
Florida 
52,286 2800 52.6 
 
Tables 4 and 5 compare the changes in number of users from 2010 to 2017. As seen in 
Table 4, Gmail has outpaced Facebook in terms of registered users and Amazon has replaced 
Twitter as the fifth largest number of registered users. Herley and Florencio (2010) used 
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QuantCast (https://www.quantcast.com) to get the number of registered users and the traffic rank 
for their data in 2010. QuantCast.com had no ranking for the University of Central Florida in 2017 
so we provided the value NA for not available in order to keep our ranking data consistent with 
that of Herley and Florencio.  
 
Table 6 
Comparison of Account Assets for Financial Institutions between 2010 and 2016 
Account Assets 2010 Assets 2016 
Min Strength 
2010 
Min Strength 
2017 
Bank of 
America 
$2,200,000,000,000 $2,198,884,000,000 41.4 41.4 
Chase $2,000,000,000,000 $2,521,029,000,000 36.2 31.0 
Citibank $1,800,000,000,000 $1,818,117,000,000 31.0 31.0 
Fidelity $1,400,000,000,000 $2,100,000,000,000 19.9 47.6 
Wells Fargo $1,200,000,000,000 $1,942,124,000,000 31.0 19.9 
Vanguard $1,000,000,000,000 $1,781,000,000,000 26.6 26.6 
PayPal* $290,000,000,000 $354,010,000,000 26.6 26.6 
 
In Herley and Florencio’s study of password practices (2010), they tested the hypothesis 
that accounts with higher assets have more strict password policies. Therefore, they collected 
data on account assets for financial accounts from FFIEC (2016, September 30). We also 
collected the FFIEC data for account assets in 2016 because this portion of our data was 
collected in February 2017. Like Herley and Florencio, we list annual transaction volume for 
assets for PayPal since they do not manage assets (“PayPal's annual payment volume from 2012 
to 2016 (in billion U.S. dollars”, 2017). 
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Table 7 
Comparison of Password Strengths for Top Phished Brands in 2010 
Account 
Number of Phishing 
Attacks 
Min Strength 2010 
PayPal 32205 27.0 
Chase 25901 36.2 
eBay 18738 31.0 
Bank of America 4540 41.0 
IRS 3712 47.0 
Citibank 2265 31.0 
Facebook 2217 20.0 
Gmail 761 27.0 
Yahoo 761 20.0 
Wells Fargo 541 31.0 
 
Table 8 
Comparison of Password Strengths for Top Phished Brands in 2017 
Web Application Min Strength 2017 
Facebook 26.6 
Wells Fargo 19.9 
Bank of America 41.4 
LinkedIn 19.9 
Booking 26.6 
IRS 48.9 
Amazon 19.9 
Steam 52.7 
Apple 47.6 
Alibaba 19.9 
 
Since Herley and Florencio tested a hypothesis related to the password policies of top 
phished accounts, they gathered data on the most phished brands from Avira (“The Most Phished 
Brands of 2009”, 2009). However, Avira has not updated their data in recent years; therefore, we 
used reports from Stastica (“Online brands most affected by phishing attacks as of 1st quarter 
2016, by share of attacks”, 2017) and PhishMe (“Most Phished Brands ‘Missed’ by AntiVirus 
Based on Big Data Security Intelligence – Q3 2013”, 2013) to determine the top phished brands 
but we could not get data on number of phishing attacks. We provide data on the password 
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strengths for top phished accounts in 2017 without the exact number of phishing attacks in Table 
6. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
The following are the hypotheses that we tested based on Herley and Florencio’s 
hypotheses. 
• A majority of web applications that have higher traffic or number of users enforce 
stricter password policies. 
•  A majority of web applications that have that use public username have 
stronger password policies. 
•  A majority of web applications that have high value assets enforce stronger 
password policies. 
•  A majority of web applications that have higher extractable value enforce 
stronger password policies. 
•  A majority of web applications that pay to attract traffic correlates less stringent 
password policies. 
•  A majority of web applications that compete for user traffic correlates less 
stringent password policies. 
We did not test the hypothesis by Herley and Florencio (2010) that password policy 
strengths increased based on evidence of brute force attacks. Their argument does not involve 
data gathered from any online web applications. In addition, Herley and Florencio’s (2010) 
reasoning that password policies cannot change easily, that only when policies are too weak is 
there any indication of an attack, that best practices inhibit gathering evidence, and that web 
applications cannot differentiate between brute force and other attacks are arguments that still 
hold today. We could not gather data that could be used for a more formal argument regarding 
the presence of brute force attacks, hence we did not retest this hypothesis, which was rejected 
by Herley and Florencio (2010). 
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One consideration that can affect the password strength given a web application’s 
password policy is the amount of user traffic that a web application receives or the number of 
registered users for a web application. If a web application has a large number of users, then it 
the number of usernames for the service is likely high. With a large amount of the username pool 
utilized, a large-scale guessing attack could be deployed in order to try to guess the usernames 
for web applications. Based on these assumptions, one would assume that with a large number 
of users that the password policy of a web application would be stricter. We test this hypothesis 
using the same method employed by Herley and Florencio (2010) as seen in Tables 4 and 5. 
Tables 4 and 5 shows the password policy strength for the top five web applications for registered 
users and the five largest U.S. universities. Based on this table, the password policy of accounts 
with more user traffic tend to have stronger password policies. The only exceptions are Facebook 
with a password strength of 26.6 bits and the University of Central Florida with a strength of 52.6 
bits. These two exceptions do not provide a sufficient evidence to reject this hypothesis, hence 
we fail to reject the hypothesis that more user traffic or a high number of registered users 
correlates with stronger password policies. This is different than the findings of Herley and 
Florencio (2010) who rejected this hypothesis. 
In regard to large-scale guessing attacks, one would assume that if the username was 
publicly available via email address or username lookup, then the attacker would be able to 
acquire the list of usernames with less difficulty than if the usernames were not public. Since 
large-scale guessing attacks dispense their brute force guessing attempts evenly to web 
applications in order to mitigate lock outs and intrusion detection schemes, an attacker who 
possesses a public list of usernames would have an increased likelihood of a successful attack. If 
the login credential is an email address, this may be problematic. It is a common tactic to use 
one’s name as the local part of the email address, such as GarrettGutierrez@email-service.com. 
This especially true for companies who assign emails automatically to employees based on their 
name. Given this argument, we expect that the fact that usernames are publicly available for a 
web application means that the password policy strength is stronger than a web application 
without publicly available usernames. Appendix B shows the table of password strengths for the 
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top social media, top email providers, and universities gathered for the 70 web applications 
corresponding to the web applications of Herley and Florencio. The password strengths for email 
providers tends to be in the 40-bit range, social media is in the 19 to 26-bit range, and universities 
tend to be in the 35 to 65-bit range. These are the type of web applications that Herley and 
Florencio (2010) considered to have public usernames. Given this data, we cannot support the 
claim that web applications enforce stricter password policies based on having public usernames. 
Hence, we reject the hypothesis that web applications with public usernames have stronger 
passwords as Herley and Florencio did in 2010. 
Monetary assets are typically regarded as high value. Thus, web applications that 
manage finances and that have a large number of assets are expected to be well protected. We 
tested the hypothesis that web applications with larger assets have stronger password policies. 
As seen in Table 6, except for Wells Fargo, web applications with high value assets tend to have 
stronger bit strengths. Since there is only one counterexample to this hypothesis, we fail to reject 
this hypothesis, which Herley and Florencio rejected in 2010. 
Herley and Florencio also examined the whether the value of extractable assets affected 
the strictness of password policy by analyzing the top phished brands using the assumption that 
attackers who phish web applications do so because the web applications have an extractable 
value. We expect web applications with high extractable assets to be have stronger password 
policies in order to protect those assets. Tables 5 shows the password strength for the top 
phished brands in 2010 while Table 6 shows the top phished brands in 2016. In both tables, there 
is no clear indication that web applications with high extractable asset value have stronger bit 
strength. Therefore, we reject that hypothesis like Herley and Florencio did in 2010. 
We did not examine the hypothesis that web applications that bear the consequences for 
the cost of the account breaches have stronger password policies for the same reasons that we 
gave for the brute force hypothesis. There is no data that we collected that could address this 
hypothesis more formally, and Herley and Florencio (2010) claim that the banks and brokerages 
provide examples that led them to reject that hypothesis. 
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Revenue is one of the main drivers for any business, and this is no different for online 
web applications. For applications that receive revenue based on advertising, we expect that 
these web applications would prioritize making advertising as prevalent as possible in order to 
maximize profit. In some cases, users logging into the web application in order to access its 
services represents a revenue opportunity to the web applications. Therefore, web applications 
that allow users to quickly gain access to their account will likely be able to earn more profit. 
Thus, we expect the web applications that allow advertising to have weaker password policies so 
that users can quickly access their accounts. The data from Appendix B shows that accounts that 
accept advertising have a wide variety of password policies. The range of bit strength ranges 
from 13 to 45 bits with an average of 29 bits of strength. Out of 28 accounts that accept 
advertising, 20 accounts had a bit strength of fewer than 35 bits. Since a majority of web 
applications had relatively weak passwords, we fail to reject the hypothesis that web applications 
that allow advertising have weaker password policies, which was the same result from Herley and 
Florencio (2010). 
Like Herley and Florencio, we collect data on Google AdWords in order to determine if a 
web application’s willingness to purchase advertising relates to weak password policies. Google 
Adwords Protocol (https://adwords.google.com/home/) is an advertisement method provided by 
Google to allow businesses and web applications to purchase certain keywords that when 
searched by a user, the search result will show the advertisement for the web application as the 
top result of the search query. According to Alexa.com, Google is the top ranked globally and 
nationally in terms of traffic, thus web applications that purchase AdWords can have their 
advertising exposed to a potentially large number of people (“Google.com Traffic Statistics”, 
2017). As with Herley and Florencio (2010), we searched each web application name with and 
without spaces using the Google search engine. In addition, we used a new incognito browser 
after each time that we searched for two different web applications. According to “Why you may 
not see your ad” (2017), repeated searches and previous search history may cause AdWords to 
not properly show. By using a new incognito browser for sets of searches, we decreased the 
chance that an ad word was not shown when there exists an AdWord for a particular web 
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application. An example is the search term for Citi Bank. Using a non-incognito browser did not 
cause the ad word to show but using an incognito browser allowed the ad word to show. As 
Herley and Florencio (2010) noted, lack of presence of an ad word does not mean that the 
account did not purchase an ad word. As Appendix B shows, only 12 accounts visibly purchased 
AdWords. 7 of the accounts had a password strength fewer than 35 bits while 5 accounts had a 
password strength between 40 bits and 50 bits. The average password strength was 37 bits. 
Based on this information, we cannot conclude that purchasing AdWords correlates with weak 
password policies. Thus, we reject the hypothesis that accounts that are willing to advertise have 
weaker password policies, which goes against the findings of Herley and Florencio (2010) who 
failed to reject that hypothesis. 
The profit of a business is affected by whether the audience must use the services of the 
business or whether the business must compete for user traffic. Businesses or accounts that 
have a captive audience do not have to worry about attracting customers so they may not focus 
on usability of the service because the user has no other choice but to use that service. On the 
other hand, accounts that must compete for user traffic only make money if the user chooses that 
service compared to other services so usability would be a prime concern. Since complex 
passwords are not as usable for users who want to quickly gain access to their account, we 
expect that accounts that must compete for users have weaker password policies. Appendix B 
shows whether users have a choice for services for a web application. Herley and Florencio 
determined user choice based on the type of web application where they declared no choice for 
universities applications and government as well as some banks. We follow their methodology for 
consistency. There are 27 web applications where the user has choice and 18 of those web 
applications have password strengths fewer than 35 bits while the other 8 web applications have 
password strengths between 40 and 65 bits. For the other 43 web applications with no user 
choice, 38 web applications have a password policy strength of over 35 bits with only 5 web 
applications having a password policy of fewer than 35 bits. Thus, on average, web applications 
where users have choice have weaker password policies compared to web applications where 
the users have no other choices. Hence, we fail to reject the hypothesis that web applications 
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where users have choice have weaker password policies, which was the same result as Herley 
and Florencio (2010). 
 
Table 9 
Hypothesis Comparison between 2010 and 2017 
Hypothesis 2010 Result 2017 Result 
Web applications with high user traffic or number of users have 
strong password policies 
Fail to reject Reject 
Web applications with public usernames have strong password 
policies 
Reject Reject 
Web applications with high assets have strong password 
policies 
Fail to reject Reject 
Web applications with high extractable assets have strong 
password policies 
Reject Reject 
Web applications that accept advertisement have weak 
password policies 
Fail to reject Fail to reject 
Web applications that advertise have weak password policies Fail to reject Reject 
Web applications where users have choice have weak 
password policies 
Fail to reject Fail to reject 
 
Statistics 
Table 10 
Password Strengths for 274 Web Applications and Multistep Authentication Presence 
Category Median Strength Average Strength Number of Web 
Applications 
Multistep  41.3594 38.31625 70 
No Multistep 26.57542 29.26745 205 
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Table 11 
Password Strengths for Multistep Authentication Web Applications by Category 
Category Median Strength Average Strength Number of Web 
Applications 
Banks and 
Brokerages 
36.18948 37.20613 10 
College 47.63357 46.61283 19 
Email Provider 33.96741 32.13695 8 
Gaming 34.31153 36.25275 8 
Government 48.95123 52.35047 6 
Online Shopping 19.93157 23.62756 3 
Social Media 23.2535 23.2535 4 
Software Service 
Provider 
28.20264 33.33187 9 
Travel 41.3594 33.10948 3 
 
Table 12 
Password Strengths for Non-Multistep Authentication Web Applications by Category 
Category Median Strength Average Strength Number of Web 
Applications 
Airlines 28.20264 34.65116 10 
Banks and 
Brokerages 
31.01955 34.46617 3 
College 47.63357 46.11863 10 
Computer 26.57542 30.22521 8 
Educational 19.93157 21.22664 6 
Email Providers 49.60451 46.52284 4 
Entertainment 19.93157 19.6733 27 
Gaming 33.21928 32.87274 11 
Government 49.3594 57.05269 9 
Health 30.64548 30.64548 2 
Hotels and Motels 34.31153 31.94887 6 
Insurance 26.57542 31.84709 3 
News and Journalism 19.93157 23.64611 18 
Online Shopping 26.57542 28.85275 40 
Real Estate 4.70044 12.45908 5 
Restaurants 26.57542 29.72413 20 
Social Media 19.93157 19.19336 9 
Software Service 
Provider 
27.38903 29.19011 6 
Travel 26.57542 24.28738 8 
 
  43 
 
In order to better examine the password policy trends, we examine the combination of 
password strength and multistep options. Tables 10, 11, and 12 show the average and median 
password strengths for the web applications that offer multistep authentication and those that do 
not. 70 accounts of 274 web applications (25%) allow multistep and 205 web applications do not 
(75%). When separating data into categories, we found that some categories only had one 
account when considering whether accounts offered multifactor authentication. To make the 
groupings more meaningful, we merged the few accounts from airline and hotels into travel and 
research into educational. 
Based on Table 10, web applications with multistep authentication on average had 
stronger password policies than web applications without multistep authentication options. From 
Tables 11 and 12, for almost every category except categories such as Government and Online 
Shopping, web applications that allow multistep authentication have stronger password policies. 
This result may be due to the fact that accounts that are willing to invest in security features such 
as multifactor authentication also want their password mechanisms to be reasonable secure as 
well. 
 
Table 13 
Password Strengths for 229 Web Applications Based on Single-Sign On Usage 
Category Median Average 
Number of Web 
Application 
Single-Sign On 19.93157 24.85569 107 
No Single-Sign On 28.20264 32.00492 122 
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Table 14 
Password Strengths for Single-Sign On Web Application by Category 
Category Median Strength Average Strength Number of Web 
Application 
Computer 26.57542 31.4418 6 
Educational 19.93157 21.22664 6 
Email Provider 23.2535 23.2535 2 
Entertainment 19.93157 20.54863 21 
Gaming 26.57542 30.92915 11 
News and Journalism 19.93157 22.8647 16 
Online Shopping 19.93157 28.50952 9 
Real Estate 12.316 14.74337 4 
Restaurants 26.57542 29.76319 6 
Social Media 19.93157 19.93157 6 
Software Service 
Provider 
27.38903 30.38078 10 
 
Table 15 
Password Strengths for No Single-Sign On Web Application by Category 
Category Median Strength Average Strength Number of Web 
Application 
Airlines 28.20264 35.261 11 
Banks and 
Brokerages 
37.1045 36.70507 4 
Computer 26.57542 33.59481 3 
Email Provider 45.84913 39.35547 8 
Entertainment 19.93157 22.94091 10 
Gaming 38.54229 38.92519 8 
Government 48.8682 51.82851 9 
Hotels and Motels 37.60352 33.67218 6 
News and Journalism 19.93157 19.93157 3 
Online Shopping 26.57542 27.76369 35 
Restaurants 26.57542 29.7074 14 
Social Media 19.93157 20.88069 7 
Software Service 
Provider 
41.91152 37.84705 4 
 
Another aspect that could affect password policy is the usage of single-sign on. Tables 
13, 14, and 15 show the password strengths for various web application based on whether they 
allow single-sign on. We merged hotels and motels into travel and health into entertainment and 
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research into educational for categories for single-sign on and we merged college to educational 
and real estate into online shopping for non-single-sign on web application. 
Based on the data, it appears that web applications that offer single-sign on use on 
average weaker passwords than web applications that do not offer single-sign on. It is important 
to note that not all web applications have the same security needs, thus some web applications 
may have weaker security practices but they are acceptable to that web application. The 
categories that have the most single-sign on applications are Entertainment, Gaming, Online 
Shopping, and Software Service Provider. The categories Gaming and Software Service 
providers overall have strong password bit strengths while Online Shopping has an overall 
medium average bit strength and Entertainment has a weak average bit strength. When 
compared to those same categories for web applications without single-sign on, most of the 
average password bit strengths increased. In addition, most categories for web applications 
without single-sign on have stronger average passwords than categories for web applications 
with single-sign. One reason for this observation could be the web applications that allow single-
sign on assume users will use the single sign on in place of the web application’s default 
authentication mechanism. Logging in with the credentials for one web application instead of 
remembering credentials for many web applications is more usable for the user, hence the web 
application may assume that users will opt for this option. In addition, the nature of web 
applications that offer single sign on tends to be related to recreation such as journalism, 
restaurants, and entertainment. Thus, these web applications may not be as security conscious 
or require a high level of security. Therefore, relying on the security of another web application’s 
authentication mechanism is acceptable for their security and business model. 
 
Table 16 
Password Strengths for 229 Web Applications and Continuous Authentication 
Category Median Strength Average Strength 
Number of Web 
Applications 
Continuous Auth 26.57542 29.05927 77 
No Continuous Auth 26.57542 28.37452 152 
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Table 17 
Password Strengths for Continuous Authentication Web Applications by Category 
Category Median Strength Average Strength 
Number of Web 
Applications 
Airlines 43.8723 43.8723 2 
Banks and 
Brokerages 
47.63357 42.29623 3 
Computer 33.78257 33.78257 2 
Educational 34.23014 34.23014 2 
Email Provider 45.60352 39.49398 5 
Entertainment 19.93157 19.19336 9 
Gaming 33.96741 33.59825 10 
News and Journalism 19.93157 21.59253 4 
Online Shopping 27.38903 29.04906 18 
Restaurants 37.1045 36.70507 4 
Social Media 19.93157 21.26034 10 
Software Service 
Provider 
28.20264 31.92259 3 
Travel 26.57542 23.2535 5 
 
Table 18 
Password Strengths for Non-Continuous Authentication Web Applications by Category 
Category Median Strength Average Strength 
Number of Web 
Applications 
Airlines 28.20264 33.34738 9 
Computer 26.57542 31.69573 7 
Educational 19.93157 21.48566 5 
Email Provider 41.3594 32.77616 5 
Entertainment 19.93157 20.93626 21 
Gaming 33.21928 33.81326 9 
Government 48.8682 51.82851 9 
Hotels and Motels 37.60352 33.67218 6 
News and Journalism 19.93157 22.61732 15 
Online Shopping 23.5022 26.77836 27 
Real Estate 12.316 14.74337 4 
Restaurants 26.57542 27.9789 16 
Social Media 19.93157 17.71695 3 
Software Service 
Provider 
28.20264 32.67529 11 
Travel 26.57542 25.13215 5 
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If web applications require continuous authentication, the user can be burdened by 
repeatedly re-authenticating into their account. This can be cumbersome for users, especially if 
their password is complex. The user burden of continuous authentication may influence web 
applications to relax their password requirements so that users are not overly fatigued. Hence, we 
investigated how password strength relates to the presence with continuous authentication. 
Tables 16, 17, and 18 show the password strengths of web applications based on whether they 
use continuous authentication. For web applications that did not offer continuous authentication, 
we merged banks and brokerage into online shopping since it only had one web application in its 
category. 
Surprisingly, there does not seem be much of a relationship between password strength 
and presence of continuous authentication. The average passwords strength for web applications 
with and without continuous authentication are similar. With the exception of a few categories 
such as Airlines and Computers, Tables 17 and 18 provide evidence that the average password 
policy for various categories based on presence of continuous authentication is relatively similar. 
While web applications that offer continuous authentication have stronger password policies in 
some of the categories, there is no clear pattern in regard to continuous authentication, thus we 
cannot claim there is a relation between the use of continuous authentication and the strictness of 
the password policy. 
 
Table 19 
Password Strengths for 274 Web Applications and Presence of HTTPS Usage 
Category Median Strength Average Strength 
Number of Web 
Applications 
HTTPS 27.38903 32.6808 252 
Non-HTTPS 19.93157 19.40878 23 
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Table 20 
Password Strengths for HTTPS Web Applications by Category 
Category Median Strength Average Strength 
Number of Web 
Applications 
Airlines 28.20264 34.65116 10 
Banks and 
Brokerages 
31.01955 36.57383 13 
College 47.63357 46.12838 28 
Computer 26.57542 32.15947 9 
Educational 19.93157 21.22664 6 
Email Providers 41.3594 35.9594 11 
Entertainment 19.93157 20.93626 21 
Gaming 35.72518 35.2042 17 
Government 49.03426 55.1718 15 
Hotels and Motels 34.31153 31.94887 6 
Insurance 26.57542 31.84709 3 
News and Journalism 19.93157 24.57938 12 
Online Shopping 26.57542 29.31071 41 
Real Estate 25.47556 25.47556 2 
Restaurants 26.57542 30.23953 19 
Social Media 19.93157 20.44263 13 
Software Service 
Provider 
28.20264 31.67517 15 
Travel 26.57542 26.69341 11 
 
Table 21 
Password Strengths for Non-HTTPS Web Applications by Category 
Category Median Strength Average Strength 
Number of Web 
Applications 
College 55.23562 55.23562 1 
Entertainment 19.93157 19.10109 8 
New and Journalism 19.93157 22.97853 8 
Online Shopping 19.93157 14.39502 3 
Real Estate 3.321928 3.781432 3 
 
A user who has a strong password is still vulnerable if the attacker can steal their session 
information after a user successfully authentications. Thus, web applications should use some 
form of session protection such as the use of HTTPS in order to mitigate this attack. We examine 
the relations of password policies with presence of HTTPS in order to address this. Tables 19, 20, 
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and 21 show the password strengths for web applications based on whether they use HTTPS. 
For HTTPS web applications, we merged health into entertainment, merge research into 
educational; and for non-HTTPS web applications merged restaurant into online shopping and 
health into entertainment.  
The data from Tables 19, 20, and 21 strongly indicate that web applications that use 
HTTPS enforce stricter password policies. In every category except College, web applications in 
the HTTPS category have a stronger average password policy. This makes sense as 
organizations that desire to protect users’ accounts would want to provide session based security 
as well as the privacy, which HTTPS provides. As stated previously, a strong password is not that 
useful if an attacker can intercept the session information. Hence, it is not unexpected that web 
application that do not use HTTPS do not require strong passwords. 
 
Table 22 
Password Strengths for 229 Web Applications and Storage of Financial Information 
Category Median Strength Average Strength 
Number of Web 
Applications 
Financial Information 26.57542 29.51079 109 
Non-Financial 
Information 
24.91446 27.89568 120 
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Table 23 
Password Strengths for Applications that Store Financial Information by Category 
Category Median Strength Average Strength 
Number of Web 
Applications 
Airlines 32.90308 35.96683 10 
Banks and 
Brokerages 
26.57542 31.38019 3 
Computer 26.57542 30.179 4 
Email Providers 33.96741 30.98411 4 
Entertainment 19.93157 18.98245 7 
Gaming 26.57542 34.47579 7 
Hotels and Motels 34.31153 32.57485 6 
News and Journalism 18.2706 18.2706 2 
Online Shopping 30.45845 30.55779 34 
Restaurants 26.57542 30.96289 12 
Social Media 19.93157 18.82426 6 
Software Service 
Provider 
36.18948 35.52873 5 
Travel 26.57542 23.4343 9 
 
Table 24 
Password Strengths for Applications that Do Not Store Financial Info by Category 
Category Median Strength Average Strength 
Number of Web 
Applications 
Computer 26.57542 33.74385 5 
Educational 19.93157 25.12694 7 
Email Providers 45.84913 39.56905 6 
Entertainment 19.93157 19.91588 21 
Gaming 34.47223 34.19097 12 
Government 49.1138 52.35288 8 
Health 30.64548 30.64548 2 
News and Journalism 19.93157 22.88757 17 
Online Shopping 19.93157 27.08826 13 
Real Estate 4.70044 12.45908 5 
Restaurants 24.91446 27.866 8 
Social Media 19.93157 21.82981 7 
Software Service 
Provider 
28.20264 30.83915 9 
 
Web applications that store financial information have monetary value that should be 
protected against attackers. One method of preventing attackers from accessing the financial 
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data stored on the account is making passwords harder to crack. We examine the relation of the 
password policy strength with a web application’s ability to store financial information. We merged 
college with online shopping for web applications with financial information and we merged 
airlines, banks, and hotels and motels into online shopping and college and research into 
educational for web applications without financial information. 
The data from Tables 22, 23, and 24 do not provide a clear indication of a relationship 
between password policy strength and ability to store financial information. While the average 
password strength for web applications that allow users store financial information is slightly 
higher than the average for web applications without financial information, categories like 
Computer, Email Providers, and Social Media provide counterexamples to the claim that there is 
a correlation with password strength and ability to store financial information. It is expected that 
web applications that store valuable information should offer increased protection over web 
application that do not hold such valuable data. These results suggest that the value of an 
account via the ability store financial information is not a major force that drives strength in 
password policy. 
 
Discussion 
The data for 274 web applications indicates that there is a concentration of web 
application with password strengths fewer than 35 bits. This indicates that many web applications 
still allow relatively weak passwords for their web applications. When the web applications were 
separated by domain type, .com web application were much weaker than both .edu and .gov web 
application, which is expected. However, from our comparison to existing results by Herley and 
Florencio (2010), there is a stark increase in password strength. From 2010 to 2017, the amount 
of web applications with fewer than 15-bit strength decreased from 8% to 5%, and there is an 
increase from 19% to 40% for web applications with bit strengths between 45 and 55 bits. Even 
when the data is separated by domain type, all web applications in each domain category from 
2017 have fewer web applications with low bit strengths and more web application with higher bit 
strengths. Table 3 reinforces this result by showing that the median password strength for every 
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web application group either stayed the same or increased since 2010. Therefore, the data 
indicates that password policies are slowly becoming stricter. This may be due to the fact that the 
public cases of account breaches are applying pressure on online web applications to properly 
protect their users by implementing more security features. 
This data trends support the results of retesting some of Herley and Florencio’s (2010) 
hypotheses. We failed to reject the hypothesis that more user traffic correlates with stronger 
password policies. Unlike the results from Herley and Florencio who rejected that hypothesis, we 
found that web applications with high traffic had relatively strong passwords. As explained 
previously, the publicity of compromised web application by major organizations may be a major 
factor as to why web applications that rely on user traffic for revenue are willing to sacrifice login 
usability for security. However, we reject the hypothesis that web application with public 
usernames have stronger passwords. The password strengths for web applications with public 
usernames and emails as usernames did not seem to have a pattern relating to password 
strength. Rather, web application groups had clusters of password strengths where email 
providers had strict password requirements while social media providers had weak password 
requirements. This seems to indicate that web application type has bearing on the strength of the 
password policy and that whether username is public is not taken into much consideration. 
Unlike Herley and Florencio, we fail to reject the hypothesis that web applications with 
high value assets have stronger password policies. It seems that web application providers who 
own a large number of assets want to protect those assets by improving the security of their 
authentication mechanism. Unlike 2010, web application providers in 2017 seem to consider their 
account assets when creating their password policies.  
We rejected the hypothesis that web applications with high extractable value have 
stronger password policies. The web applications with the most phishing attacks had a diverse 
set of password strengths and no positive correlation with stronger password strength. One 
reason for this could be that the consequences for user who is the victim of a phishing attack are 
not significant enough to majorly influence password policy. It appears that these web 
applications weigh other factors with importance when considering password policy. 
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Unlike Herley and Florencio, we failed to reject hypotheses accepting advertisements and 
user choice correlate with weaker password policies. Despite the fact that web application 
password trends are heading towards stronger policies, web applications that rely on, user 
choice, and accepting advertisements have relatively weak passwords compared to other web 
applications. Thus, Herley and Florencio’s findings from 2010 seem to hold true today: the profit 
motive still exerts a pressure on organizations to weaken their password policies so that users 
can more easily access their services. On a seemingly contradictory note, we rejected the 
hypothesis that purchasing advertisements correlates with weaker passwords. The web 
applications that use AdWords had diverse password policies strengths between 19 bits and 49 
bits. Over half of the web applications that used AdWords had bit strengths at least greater than 
30 bits and many of the web applications fell into the banks and university categories. Since 
universities and banks have been shown to have stronger password policies, the increase in 
universities and banks using AdWords explains why we reject this hypothesis while Herley and 
Florencio failed to reject it. 
 
Limitations 
Checking passwords for inconsistent requirements was not performed extensively. 
Especially during account registration, entering an invalid password could potentially cause a 
registration error where our account would be registered but there would be no way to login with a 
valid password. This prevented a full examination on whether posted requirements matched 
enforced requirements. In addition, previous passwords were not extensively tested. We did not 
test if previous passwords were allowed for change password, but we tested if current password 
could be used in change password. Typically, the account provided a notification whether 
previous passwords are accepted, which we did document. In addition, we could not find reliable 
password policies for all web application, especially for insurance companies. 
Many types of the data recorded by QuantCast in 2010 such as number of registered 
users and whether an account accepts ads are no longer available today. We used various 
resources to estimate the number of users for various online web application. Since the sources 
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were various, the data may not be completely accurate. The manual inspection of ads does not 
guarantee that a web application accepts ads in some cases. Some web application used Google 
Ad Manager or used for Third-Party content but could be using Ad Manager frameworks for their 
own ads. Without QuantCast directly collecting the data, we cannot guarantee that accurate of ad 
acceptance.  
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CHAPTER 5 
SECURITY QUESTION PRACTICES 
In our examination of 282 online web applications, we found that 78 online web 
applications (28%) use security questions in some fashion. Out of the 230 web applications for 
which we created an account, we gathered security question data for 47 web applications. Of 
those 47 web applications, only 3 web applications (230 web applications: 1.3%, security 
question web applications: 6%) implemented security questions in primary authentication in 
addition to username and password. 11 web applications (230 web applications: 4.8%, security 
question web applications: 23%) used security questions to provide continuous authentication for 
web applications, usually for accessing user settings. In terms of fallback authentication, 31 web 
applications (230 web applications: 13%, security question web applications: 66%) used security 
questions in some form during password recovery.15 web applications (overall: 13%, security 
question web applications: 32%) allowed users to recover their password with only their security 
questions. The average number of minimum security questions for each web application was 1.89 
while the average number of maximum security questions that can be registered was 1.97. On 
average, each web application provides a choice from 10.3 possible questions. 
 
Security Question Classification 
One of our goals was to classify security questions that are used in practice into 
meaningful categories in order to assess their usability and resistance to attack. We based our 
security question classification on existing classifications proposed by Just (2004), Rabkin (2008), 
and Reeder and Schechter (2011). In terms of security, Just (2004) proposed the following 
category: guessing difficulty and observation difficulty. Guessing difficulty is measured as the 
number of attempts that an attacker would need to guess the answer. Questions that are not 
guessable should also have answer spaces with distribution that is close to uniform. Observation 
difficulty is the measurement of how difficult it would be for an attacker to retrieve or observe the 
answer to the question based on publicly available sources. Similarly, Rabkin (2008) proposed 
guessable, attackable, and automatically attackable as categories where a question is 
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automatically attackable if the answer can be found on any public social media while a question is 
attackable if the attacker can learn the answer with a substantial probability. Likewise, Reeder 
and Schechter (2011) use the categories of guessable, researchable, and known attacker. In 
terms of usability, Just (2004) defined the categories of applicable, memorable, and repeatable. 
Similarly, Rabkin (2008) defined the usable categories of inapplicability, not memorable, and 
ambiguous. Reeder and Schechter (2011) proposed the usable categories of not configurable 
and forgettable. 
 
Table 25 
The Security Question Classification Categories 
Category Definition 
Ambiguous 
Answer has a variety of possible formats or there is not one specific 
answer 
Ephemeral Answer likely changed since registering the answer 
Guessable 
Upper Bound 
Upper bound on the cardinality of the most probable answer space 
Inapplicable Over 40% of the population cannot provide an answer 
Non-
configurable 
Over 40% of the population cannot recall the answer to the question 
during setup or cannot provide an answer 
Researchable 
Answer can be obtained or observed via public records, public social 
media, or other publicly available resources 
 
Based on these criteria, we defined our own classifications as seen in Table 25. To 
elaborate, the guessability of a question is defined as the upper bound on the most probable 
answer space for that question (i.e., if the most common answers covers 50% or more of the 
answer space). Thus, questions with smaller probable answer sets are more guessable than 
questions with large and uniformly distributed answers sets.  
During our formulation of the classification, we initially included three additional 
categories: known attacker friend, known attacker family, and forgettable. The category known 
attacker friend encompasses the notion that the answer to the question is known or easily 
observable by a relatively close friend. One issue with this category is properly defining how close 
a friend is to a user. Based on how much information a user shares with a friend, there could be 
wide variation in the knowledge of a known attacker who is a friend. Childhood friends are more 
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likely to know the answers to questions about childhood while more recent friends could answer 
questions about recent preferences, activities, or trips. Similarly, the known attacker family 
category encompasses the ability of a parent, sibling, child, or spouse to know or easily obtain the 
answer to the question. This category also has the same problem where the attackers could have 
completely different levels of knowledge so it is hard to consider all attackers in this category as 
equally able to answer questions. A spouse should be able to know intimate details about the 
user’s life, but a person can have multiple spouses over different periods of their life. Parents and 
siblings likely know information about a user’s childhood while children are likely to know about 
more recent preferences, activities, and opinions. Hence, it is difficult to assign a specific value to 
security questions for the categories of known attacker friend and known attacker family without 
making sweeping generalizations or assumptions that do not correctly capture the abilities of all 
attackers within a specific category. 
The category of forgettable is related to the categories of inapplicable, ambiguous, and 
ephemeral. Inapplicable questions cannot be forgettable as they are not able to be configured. It 
is likely that user would forget the answer to a question if the question is ephemeral. Also, it is 
likely that a user would not forget all answers to an ambiguous question but may not remember 
the registered answer or how it was originally formatted. Due to its complexity, the category of 
forgettable requires its own study, which is evident from the fact that Bonneau et al. (2015) 
studied the forgettable category in their research on security questions.  
The 47 web applications where we collected security question data yielded 217 unique 
questions. We consider a question to be unique if it has a unique answer space that is distinct 
from the other questions. For example, the questions “What is your grandmother’s name?” and 
“What is your paternal grandmother’s first name?” as two distinct questions because a user could 
answer with the full name for either the paternal or maternal grandmother in the first question but 
the user must reply with the first name of their paternal grandmother in the second question. We 
classified each of the 217 questions into the categories of ambiguous, ephemeral, researchable, 
inapplicable, and non-configurable. 
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Figure 11. Distribution of security questions by category. 
 
Table 26 
Number of Security Questions per Classification 
Classification Number of Questions Percent 
Ambiguous 58 26.7% 
Ephemeral 60 27.6% 
Researchable 127 58.5% 
Inapplicable 15 6.9% 
Non-Configurable 17 7.8% 
Guessable (answer space < 1000) 93 42.9% 
 
Figure 11 and Table 26 show the number of questions that were classified into each 
security question category. Since many of the categories are not mutually exclusive, a question 
could apply to more than one category. For usability, 26.7% of security questions were 
ambiguous, 27.6% were ephemeral, 6.9% of questions cannot be used since they are 
inapplicable, and 7.8% are non-configurable. In terms of security, more than half (58.5%) of 
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security questions can be researched via public resources and 42.9% of questions had answer 
spaces smaller than 1000 answers. 
Security Question Practices 
Table 27 
Usage of Security Questions and Multistep Authentication in Web Applications 
Category 
Number of Web 
Applications 
Percent 
Presence of Security 
Question and Multistep 
37 13.1% 
Not Both 245 86.9% 
 
Table 28 
Applications Not using Security Questions and Multistep Authentication by Category 
Category 
Number of Web 
Applications 
Percent 
Airlines 1 2.7% 
Banks and Brokerages 8 21.6% 
Computer 0 0.0% 
College 14 37.8% 
Educational 0 0.0% 
Email Providers 3 8.1% 
Entertainment 0 0.0% 
Gaming 3 8.1% 
Government 4 10.8% 
Health 0 0.0% 
Hotels and Motels 1 2.7% 
Insurance 0 0.0% 
News and Journalism 0 0.0% 
Online Shopping 1 2.7% 
Real Estate 0 0.0% 
Research 0 0.0% 
Restaurants 0 0.0% 
Social Media 2 5.4% 
Software Service Provider 0 0.0% 
Travel 0 0.0% 
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Table 29 
Applications Not Using Both Security Questions and Multistep Authentication by Category 
Category Total Percent 
Airlines 10 4.1% 
Banks and Brokerages 8 3.3% 
Computer 16 6.5% 
College 8 3.3% 
Educational 5 2.0% 
Email Providers 8 3.3% 
Entertainment 28 11.4% 
Gaming 16 6.5% 
Government 11 4.5% 
Health 2 0.8% 
Hotels and Motels 6 2.4% 
Insurance 5 2.0% 
News and Journalism 19 7.8% 
Online Shopping 41 16.7% 
Real Estate 5 2.0% 
Research 2 0.8% 
Restaurants 20 8.2% 
Social Media 12 4.9% 
Software Service Provider 14 5.7% 
Travel 9 3.7% 
 
Tables 27, 28, and 29 show the number of web applications that offer both security 
questions and multistep authentication options. Only 13% of web applications offered both 
security questions and multistep authentication options. The categories where both security 
questions and multistep authentication mechanisms are used the most are Colleges and Banks 
and Brokerages. This suggests that colleges and financial institutions are likely to use defense in 
depth for protecting their web applications. 
We examined the use of security questions and the presence of CAPTCHAs. While no 
web application used CAPTCHAs in conjunction with security questions, 5 web applications (230 
web applications: 2%, among security questions: 11%), used security questions and employed an 
CAPTCHA for some other mechanism. The main purpose of using CAPTCHAs security questions 
is to prevent large-scale guessing attacks. If an attacker uses automated scripts to try to attack 
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multiple accounts on a large-scale, using a CAPTCHA will prevent the automated scripts from 
being effective since it can be difficult for scripts to bypass more sophisticated challenge 
response mechanisms. The fact that security questions and CAPTCHAS are not both used to 
protect an account suggests that automated attacks are not a major consideration when 
considering account security. 
We assessed the use of security questions with presence of HTTPS. For 230 web 
applications, we found that 42 out of 47 web applications (230 web applications: 18%, among 
security questions: 89%) use security questions and have HTTPS on at least one page while 26 
web applications (230 web applications: 1%, among security questions: 55%) use security 
questions and use HTTPS on all pages. As explained previously, strong authentication practices 
are rendered less useful if an attacker can hijack the session. Web applications without HTTPS or 
without HTTPS on pages with sensitive data can be vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle-attack 
where the attacker can impersonate the web server by acting as a proxy, which is a security 
vulnerability (“95% of HTTPS Servers Vulnerable to Trivial MITM Attacks”, 2015). 
Another aspect that we examined was the presence of security questions and storage of 
financial information. Out of 230 web applications where we created an account, 109 (47%) 
stored at least one type of financial type of data, 47 (20%) used security questions in some role, 
and 27 web applications (overall: 12%, among security questions: 57%) used security questions 
and allowed storage of financial information. As seen with correlating password strength to the 
ability to store financial information, there appears not be a strong relation between using security 
questions and storing financial information. 
Appendix C shows the types of security questions and types of security question answers 
for the 47 accounts where we could observer the security questions. We use the security 
question and answer types provided by Just (2004) as defined in Table 30. 
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Table 30 
Types of Security Questions and Security Question Answers 
Name Definition 
Fixed Question A list of preset questions is provided to a user 
Open Question User has complete choice and control over the question in free-form 
text 
Controlled Question 
Add Text 
Additional text is allowed to be added, forming a modification of the 
original question 
Controlled Question 
Hint 
User-provided hint, where the hint would be presented to the individual 
for authentication 
Fixed Answer User selection of an answer from a preset list of answers 
Open Answer User manually enters their response 
Controlled Answer 
Set 
Fixed set of answers where the answer space is large enough so that 
most potential answers are allowed 
Controlled Answer 
Format 
User is allowed to enter answer where the answer format is fixed 
 
Appendix D shows the table for other security question practices. Some of these 
practices include the visibility of the answer before, during, and after typing the answer when 
editing security questions; the visibility of the answer during and after typing when answering 
security questions; whether the user must both provide the question and answer; whether the 
same question to be registered twice with different answers, and availability of security question 
recovery offline via customer support or online using the web application interface. Practices such 
as not making the answer visible while or after typing it prevent shoulder surfing attacks, but 
hamper the usability since a user may not know that they misspelled a word. Allowing the same 
security question to be registered twice makes answering the question difficult for users since 
they can provide different answers during registration but may be harder for attackers to correctly 
guess which answer the user provided. Appendix D also shows which accounts did not prompt 
security questions, which is why there are null values in a few rows of the columns Enter Answer 
Visible while Typing and Enter Answer Visible after Typing. 
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Discussion 
Our examination of security questions shows that many security questions have at least 
one potential security or usability issue. In terms of usability, a quarter of questions are 
ambiguous and a quarter of questions are ephemeral. This implies that a significant portion of 
security questions may be difficult for a user to recall correctly, which may increase false negative 
authentication rates for web applications. A small number of questions, less than 10%, are either 
inapplicable or non-configurable. Since web applications on average offer about ten questions 
from which to choose, this suggests that about one question does not apply to a user, which is 
not detrimental in terms of usability. However, our classification exposes a potential security issue 
with security questions. Over 58% of questions can be found via publicly available information. 
Additionally, about 42% of questions have a small answer space and are relatively easily 
guessable. Hence, since web applications typically require about two security questions to be 
registered, there is about a reasonable chance the chosen question chosen is either researchable 
or guessable by an attacker. This poses a major security risk. Additionally, no web application 
followed the best practices of using a large pool of registered questions and requiring a subset of 
questions to be answered. 
Based on our analysis of security questions, we have developed recommendations for 
security questions so that they are not classified as unusable or susceptible to attack.  We 
suggest creating security questions based on the following recommendations. Select questions 
with a specific answer space and answer format. For example, asking about city name or the first 
time you visited a different state has a specific answer (city name) given a specific instance 
(second time visiting a different state). Additionally, the answer to the question should not be 
available on any common public record. Hence, avoid asking questions about family members. A 
good example is a question about the title of your most hated sitcom since there is not likely a 
record that has this information. While it can be difficult to recall first time events, questions about 
a person’s first or second experience can be hard for an attacker to guess. Ideally, questions 
should have a large answer space where common answers are not easily determined. For 
instance, “what is your favorite color?” has a small answer space and has popular answers that 
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apply to a majority of the population. Favorites tend to be non-researchable as long as they do 
not appear on social media, but favorites can potentially change often and can have small answer 
pool such as the question “What is your favorite food?”. Asking about a favorite for a specific time 
in the past avoids the issue of answers frequently changing. 
 Because most web applications use a small answer pool of questions, require about two 
registered questions, and use questions with known usability and security issues, the current 
security practices for online web applications do not provide enough security to make security 
questions viable. In addition, multifactor, HTTPS, and CAPTCHAS are not used in conjunction 
with security questions, making security question practices vulnerable to hijacking and large-scale 
guessing attacks. 
 
Limitations 
Some web applications do not always prompt the user to answer their security questions. 
Hence, it is difficult to distinguish between a web application that requires security questions to be 
set up but does not use them and a web application that uses security questions in specific 
scenarios outside of primary authentication, fallback authentication, and continuous 
authentication. This issue may have affected our results for the usage of security questions in 
practice. 
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CHAPTER 6  
FALLBACK AUTHENTICATION 
We collected fallback authentication data for 230 web applications. Out of these 230 web 
applications, only three did not use any form of fallback authentication mechanism because one 
used university login mechanisms, another used system generated passwords and did not allow 
password recovery so a user would have to make a new account if they forget their password, 
and the other used the password for encrypting the account data so password recovery was not 
allowed. In terms of offering multiple types of fallback authentication, 31 web applications (14%) 
provided at least two methods of fallback authentication. For web applications that use email 
authentication, 221 web applications (97%) use email in password recovery and 191 web 
applications (83%) only use email recovery. Surprisingly, 29 web applications (13%) send a valid 
plaintext password via email where 26 applications send a new password while 3 web 
applications from Hotels and Motels and Real Estate send the current password. 52 web 
applications (23%) use defense in depth during password recovery which can involve answering 
a security question or responding to a challenge response. 
 
Fallback Authentication Usage 
Table 31 
The Practices for Fallback Authentication Given 227 Web Applications 
Fallback Authentication Practice Number of Web 
Applications 
Percent 
At Least Two Fallback Authentication Methods 31  13% 
Email Password Recovery  221 97% 
Only Allow Email Password Recovery 191 83% 
Send Plaintext Password  29 13%  
Password Recovery Defense in Depth  52 23% 
Temporary Password SMS Password Recovery 2 1% 
Call Phone Password Recovery 4 2%  
SMS OTP Recovery  20 9%  
Personal Info Password Recovery 4  2% 
 
The following are the statistics for the web applications that provide each type of fallback 
authentication method.  26 web applications (13%) allowed using a phone to recover the user’s 
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password. A total of 20 web applications (9%) used security question password recovery with five 
web applications (2%) used personal information questions not registered by the user and 15 web 
applications (7%) allowed password recovery using only security questions. In terms of email, 
221 web applications (97%) allowed email recovery, 195 of those web applications (86%) used a 
password reset link, 27 (12%) sent a new plaintext password via email, 6 (3%) used an email 
one-time password, and 3 (1%) web applications sent the current password in plaintext via email. 
Some applications allowed using either an email link or an email one-time password so those two 
recovery options are not mutually exclusive. Out of 227 web applications, only 54 (23%) listed 
when the password reset link expired, which was an average of 1795 minutes. For 227 web 
applications, only 4 (2%) provided a user the option to use trustees to recovery access to their 
web application. 
For the 282 web applications, we have partial data on the password recovery for the 
other 55 web applications. Since we had to rely on publicly posted information, we cannot fully 
verify that the data for each of these 52 web applications is comprehensive. Bearing this limitation 
in mind, we provide the statistics on fallback authentication for all 282 web applications. In terms 
of offering multiple types of fallback authentication, 40 web applications (14%) provided at least 
two methods of fallback authentication. For web applications that use email authentication, 208 
web applications (73%) only allowed email recovery. 63 web applications (22%) used defense in 
depth during password recovery. 
The following are the statistics for the web applications that provide each type of fallback 
authentication method. Three web applications (1%) allowed a user to recovery their web 
application using a help desk while five web applications (2%) allowed a user recover their web 
application in person such as an official university center. In addition, two web applications (1%) 
can send a temporary password via phone SMS, six web applications (2%) can call a phone with 
a one-time password, and 24 web applications (9%) can send a one-time password via SMS to 
the mobile phone. For security question password recovery, eight web applications (3%) used 
personal information questions not registered by the user and 32 web applications (11%) allowed 
password recovery with only security questions. In terms of email, 233 web applications (83%) 
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allowed email recovery, but we do not have complete information about what type of email 
recovery that could be used.  
Some web applications allowed recovery via a threshold of other users confirming the 
user’s identity. These trusted users are called “trustees”. Considering all 282 web applications, 5 
web applications (2%) enable trustees to be used for fallback authentication. 
 
Security of Fallback Authentication 
We compare the fallback recovery process of each of the 227 accounts that we created 
and assess their adherence to fallback authentication best practices. The Open Web Application 
Security Project (“Forgot Password Cheat Sheet”, 2016) provides a guide for one method of 
implementing password recovery securely. We use their recommended practices in order to 
assess the password recovery mechanisms used by each web application. In order to assess n 
web application’s adherence to these best practices, we assign a score to each web application 
based on the number of best practices steps that the web application implements. 
 
Table 32 
Scoring for Adherence to Fallback Authentication Best Practices 
Scoring Fallback Authentication 
Feature Score 
Security Question Used +1 
One-Time Token Sent via External Channel +1 
CAPTCHA Used +1 
Log out User after Password Change +1 
Lock Out User until Recovery Complete -1 
Plaintext Password Sent -1 
 
 We assign a point to a web application’s security score for each of the following best 
practices that are met: using at least one security question during password recovery, using an 
external channel to send a one-time token, usage of CAPTCHA to prevent large-scale attacks, 
and logging out the user once the password is successfully changed. If the web application 
prematurely locks out any user when password recovery is initiated, we subtract a point from their 
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security score because an attacker can perform denial of service attack on that web application, 
which can occur indefinitely in the worst case. Additionally, we subtract one point if any password 
is sent in plaintext to the user, which may imply that the password is stored in plaintext on the 
server. If an attacker compromises the user’s email account by attacking the email web 
application, then the attacker can view the plaintext password for the other account without 
initiating a password change or password recovery. Therefore, the maximum score for a web 
application is 4 points while -2 is the minimum score that a web application can receive. 
 
Table 33 
Number of Web Applications for a Password Recovery Security Score 
Score 
Number of Web 
Applications 
Percentage 
4 Points 0 0.0% 
3 Points 5 1.8% 
2 Points 15 5.3% 
1 Point 63 22.3% 
0 Points 119 42.2% 
-1 Points 14 5.0% 
-2 Points 15 5.3% 
 
  
  69 
Table 34 
Password Recovery Security Score for Web Applications in Each Category 
Category -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Airline 2 0 6 3 0 0 0 
Banks / 
Brokerages 
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Computer 1 0 4 4 0 0 0 
College 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Educational 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 
Email Providers 0 0 2 2 5 1 0 
Entertainment 1 2 18 6 1 0 0 
Gaming 0 0 8 7 2 2 0 
Government 0 3 4 1 1 0 0 
Health 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Hotels and Motels 4 1 2 0 0 0 0 
Insurance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
News / 
Journalism 
0 1 15 3 0 0 0 
Online Shopping 4 4 20 12 2 1 0 
Real Estate 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 
Research 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Restaurant 1 2 15 2 0 0 0 
Social Media 0 0 3 8 2 0 0 
Software Provider 0 0 5 7 1 1 0 
Travel 0 0 7 3 0 0 0 
Total 15 14 119 63 15 5 0 
Percent 05.3% 05.0% 42.2% 22.3% 05.3% 01.8% 00.0% 
 
Discussion 
A majority of web applications rely on email for password recovery. 221 web applications 
out of 227 used email password recovery and 191 web applications only allowed a user to 
recover their password via email. Based on these results, the security of these web applications 
is largely based on the security of the email associated with the account. If that email account 
were to be compromised, then the attacker could easily compromise the user’s other account. 
This is a potentially vulnerable practice. In addition, only 52 web applications use defense in 
depth during password recovery. If the password recovery mechanism is considerable weak for a 
web application, attackers could focus their attention on breaking the password recovery 
mechanism in order to access the accounts for users. Furthermore, 10% of web applications 
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send a new or current password to the user via email, which implies that the password is not 
hashed when stored on the server. These are all problematic practices. 
Based on our scoring for adherence to best practices, no web application out of 227 web 
applications received a perfect score of 4. We assumed that web applications did not design their 
systems considering this specific criterion so it is not surprising that no web applications followed 
all the best practices completely. Hence, about 7% of web applications follow a majority of the 
best practices for fallback authentication. The fact that 63 web applications (22.3%) of web 
applications received a score of 1 suggests that numerous web applications are considering 
some aspect of security when implementing password recovery. 199 web applications (88%) 
received a score of 0, which suggest that a majority of web applications do not adhere to any 
beneficial best practice or cancel out their use of best practices with insecure practices. On the 
other hand, 28 (12%) web applications had a negative score. This indicates that they 
implemented a vulnerable practice and did not implement any secure practices. 
The categories of web applications that implement the most secure practices are Email 
Provider, Gaming, Online Shopping, and Software Service Provider. Entertainment, News and 
Journalism, Online Shopping, and Restaurants are categories where most web applications have 
a score of 0 or 1. The categories with the worst password recovery practices are Hotels and 
Motels, Online Shopping, Real Estate, and Restaurants. These results are interesting because 
we would expect that the Banks and Brokerages, Colleges, and Government categories to 
implement the most secure mechanisms to protect the value of their web applications. Yet, the 
results from Table 34 indicate that web applications in these categories vary with regard to 
following best practices. It is the category of Email Provider that adheres to password recovery 
best practices. Since many web applications rely on the security of emails for password recovery, 
our results imply that web applications that rely on the security of the email are more protected 
due to email provider’s adherence to best practices. While a large number of web applications do 
not follow or have vulnerable password recovery practices, the situation may not be as serious 
since many of those web applications fall into categories that may not require high level of 
security such as entertainment or restaurants. 
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Limitations 
A few web applications have errors with their password recovery. The password recovery 
process may not work at all, may be initiated but never finish certain steps such as sending a 
password recovery email, or may have glitches such as claiming that a reset session is invalid 
after the email link was clicked. Some of the data gathered based on observations rather than 
specifically labeled options. For example, if a web application did not provide the option to 
invalidate sessions after a successful password reset, we manually checked if another browser 
had its session invalidated when the password reset was performed on a different browser. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 ALTERNATIVE AUTHENTICATION 
Multistep and Multifactor Authentication 
Multistep authentication is a mechanism for authentication where the user is granted 
access if they can provide at least two authentication credentials. Multifactor authentication is a 
mechanism for authentication where the user is granted access if they can provide at least two 
credentials for at least two different authentication credential types (knowledge, possession, and 
inherence). Hence, multifactor authentication is a subset of multistep authentication. For example, 
a scheme requiring a password (knowledge) and a one-time code sent to a phone (possession 
since it is a different device) is considered multifactor authentication. However, a scheme 
requiring password (knowledge) and a one-time password from email (knowledge since it is not a 
different device) is not multifactor authentication but multistep authentication. 
 We collected complete multistep authentication data for 230 web applications and 
collected any posted multistep for the remaining 52 web applications. First, we present the 
multistep statistics for the 230 web applications for which we created an account. Then, we 
provide the statistics on multistep data for all 282 accounts while acknowledging the limitation of 
not having an actual account to verify the data. 
Of the 230 web applications, only 39 web applications (17%) had at least one option for 
multistep authentication with an average of 1.51 multistep methods per web application for web 
applications that offer multistep authentication. Six web applications (230 web applications: 3%, 
among multistep: 15%) allowed email one-time password multistep authentication. Four web 
applications (230 web applications: 2%, among multistep: 11%) allowed multistep using a PIN. 
Two web applications (230 web applications 1%, among multistep: 5%) allowed security question 
multistep authentication. Multistep with W2 information, information about credit cards or debit 
cards, information about 1040 one web application (230 web applications 0.44%, among 
multistep: 3%). Out of the 39 web applications that allow multistep authentication, 35 web 
applications (230 web applications: 15%, among multistep: 90%) used multifactor authentication. 
The average number of multifactor authentication options offered by web applications was 1.26. 
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34 web applications (230 web applications: 15%, among multistep: 87%, among multifactor: 97%) 
implemented phone or mobile app one-time password multistep authentication. Three web 
applications (230 web applications: 1%, among multistep: 8%, among multifactor: 9%) allowed 
hardware token multifactor authentication. Six web applications (230 web applications: 3%, 
among multistep 16%, among multifactor: 17%) implemented the Universal Two Factor protocol. 
One web application (230 web applications 0.44%, among multistep: 3%, among multifactor: 3%) 
used biometric fingerprints for multifactor authentication. 
The following are the multistep statistics for all 282 web applications. The number of web 
applications that had at least one option for multistep authentication was 70 web applications 
(24%) with an average of 1.37 options provided per web application that offers multistep 
authentications. Eight web applications (282 web applications: 3%, among multistep: 11%) 
allowed email one-time password multistep authentication. Four web applications (282 web 
applications: 2%, among multistep: 11%) allowed multistep authentication using a PIN. Two web 
applications (282 web applications 1%, among multistep: 5%) allowed security question multistep 
authentication. Multistep with W2 information, information about credit cards or debit cards, and 
with 1040 information each was implemented by one web application (282 web applications 
0.44%, among multistep: 3%), respectively. 63 web applications (282 web applications: 22%, 
among multistep: 90%) implement multifactor authentication with an average of 1.22 options per 
web application. 56 web applications (282 web applications: 20%, among multistep: 80%, among 
multifactor: 88%) implemented phone or mobile app one-time password multifactor 
authentication. 13 web applications (282 web applications: 5%, among multistep: 19%, among 
multifactor: 21%) allowed hardware token multifactor authentication. Seven web applications (282 
web applications: 2%, among multistep: 10%, among multifactor: 11%) implemented the 
Universal Two Factor protocol. One web application (282 web applications 0.4%, among 
multistep: 3%, among multifactor: 2%) used biometric fingerprints for multifactor authentication.   
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Single-Sign On 
We provide the single-sin on statistics for the collected 230 web applications. We could 
not collect single-sign on data for the other 52 web applications so they will not be represented in 
our statistics.  
 
Table 35 
Number of Web Applications for Most Popular Single-Sign On Providers 
Single-Sign On 
Providers 
Number of Web 
Applications 
Percent 
Percent Among 
Single-Sign On 
Facebook 101 44% 94% 
Google 64 28% 60% 
Twitter 29 13% 27% 
LinkedIn 13 6% 12% 
Yahoo 12 5% 11% 
Microsoft 8 4% 7% 
 
Out of 230 web applications, 107 (47%) allow some form of single-sign on for 
authentication. 101 web applications (overall: 44%, among single-sign on: 94%) that use 
Facebook as the single-sign on provider. 64 online web applications (overall: 28%, among single-
sign on: 60%) use Google as the single-sign on provider.29 web applications (overall: 13%, 
among single-sign on: 27%) use Twitter as the single-sign on provider. The other most popular 
single-sign on providers are LinkedIn with 13 web applications (overall: 6%, among single-sign 
on: 12%), Yahoo with 12 web applications (overall: 5%, among single-sign on: 11%), and 
Microsoft with 8 web applications (overall: 4%, among single-sign on: 7%). 
 
Continuous Authentication 
For 230 web applications, 77 web applications (33%) employed continuous 
authentication.17 (overall: 7%, among continuous authentication: 22%) enforced re-entering the 
username and password to access the web application settings. One web application (230 web 
applications: 0.4%, among continuous authentication: 1%) used a one-time password to access 
web application settings. 11 web applications (230 web applications: 5%, among continuous 
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authentication: 14%) used security questions for continuous authentication. 57 web applications 
(230 web applications: 25%, among continuous authentication: 74%) required the password to be 
submitted to change the email address. 6 web applications (230 web applications: 3%, among 
continuous authentication: 8%) required the password to be submitted in order to change the 
phone number. 
Considering all 282 web applications, 79 (28%) web applications employed continuous 
authentication. 17 web applications (282 web applications: 6%, among continuous authentication: 
22%) enforced re-entering the username and password to access the web application settings. 
Two web applications (282 web applications: 1%, among continuous authentication: 3%) used a 
one-time password to access web application settings.12 web applications (282 web applications: 
4%, among continuous authentication: 15%) web applications used security questions for 
continuous authentication. 58 web applications (282 web applications: 20%, among continuous 
authentication: 72%) required the password to be submitted to change the email address. 6 (282 
web applications: 2%, among continuous authentication: 8%) web applications required the 
password to be submitted in order to change the phone number. 
 
Combination of Practices 
Table 36 
Number of Web Applications that Use a Combination of Practices 
Practice Number of Web Applications Percent  
Single-Sign On 107 47% 
Continuous Auth. 77 33% 
Store Financial Info 109 47% 
Single-Sign On and Store Financial Info 37 16% 
Continuous Auth. and Store Financial Info 45 20% 
 
We examined the presence single sign-on authentication and the ability to store financial 
information on the web applications for the 230 web applications for which we could create an 
account. 37 web applications (16%) stored at least one form of financial information on the 
account. This indicates that web applications that use single-sign are not web applications that 
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typically store financial information and hence do not store many assets related to monetary 
value.  
Additionally, we examined the presence of continuous authentication and the ability to 
store financial information for the 230 web applications for which we could create an account. 45 
web applications (20%) use continuous authentication and allows storage of at least one piece of 
financial information. If a web application does not implement continuous authentication, then an 
attacker who gains access to the session of the account without having the credentials for the 
account will be able to compromise the account since they will not be required to re-authenticate 
before account changes such as changing the password. By using continuous authentication, 
more effort is required by the attacker in order to compromise the account because the attacker 
would be asked to re-authenticate before accessing sensitive information or changing credentials. 
Thus, web applications that store valuable financial information would be more secure if they 
implemented continuous authentication. Since one-fifth of web applications use continuous 
authentication when they allow storage of financial information, only a portion of web applications 
follow this secure practice. 
 
Limitations 
For multistep authentication, we gathered data from publicly posted sources for 52 of the 
282 web applications. Thus, we were unable to verify the use of multistep authentication methods 
for those web applications. We did not make an account using a single-sign on provider for 
authentication because we wanted to test each web application’s password policy, password 
recovery mechanism, and authentication mechanism. We checked the usage of continuous 
authentication for credential change, accessing financial information, and accessing the profile 
pages. If a web application uses continuous authentication on for a page or purpose that is not 
apparent, then we did not record that data. 
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CHAPTER 8 
OTHER SECURITY PRACTICES 
To have a more complete picture of security practices, we recorded the additional 
security practices that each web application provides. Specifically, we report on HTTPS usage 
statistics, session management, multistep credential recovery, CAPTCHAS, ability to change 
credentials, deletion of accounts, and storage of financial information. 
 
HTTPS 
For the 230 accounts that we created, 206 web applications (90%) used HTTPS on at 
least on page. 127 (overall: 55%, among any HTTPS: 62%) used HTTPS on all web pages. Five 
web applications (overall: 2%, among any HTTPS: 2%) only use HTTPS at login only. 59 
accounts (overall: 27%, among any HTTPS: 29%) use the extended value SSL Certificates for 
HTTPS.  
For 282 web applications, 258 web applications (91%) use HTTPS on at least one page. 
51 web applications (overall: 53%, among those that use HTTPS: 59%) use HTTPS on all pages. 
Six web applications (overall: 2%, among those that use HTTPS: 2%) used HTTPS only at login. 
71 web applications (overall: 25%, among those that use HTTPS: 28%) use the extended value 
SSL Certificates for HTTPS. 
 
Session Management 
We recorded data on the ability to invalidate active sessions for each web application and 
whether web applications allowed the session to persist on multiple tabs for the 230 web 
applications for which we could create an account. 22 (10%) of web applications allowed some 
form of session management. 225 web applications (98%) allowed the session to persist on 
multiple tabs for the same browser.  
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Multistep Credential Recovery 
Another security feature we examined was multistep authentication credential recovery. 
This is often implemented using backup codes, which are a series of one-time codes that should 
be printed or saved for later authentication. Backup codes can be used for fallback authentication, 
yet, in this context, backup codes were used for authentication when multistep authentication is 
no longer working or accessible. 
 
Table 37 
Type of Multistep Credential Recovery Mechanism Offered for 230 Web Applications 
Multistep Credential 
Recovery 
Number of Web 
Applications 
Percent Overall 
Percent Among 
Multistep Recovery 
Backup Codes 12 5% 33% 
Customer Support 14 6% 33% 
Trusted Device 2 1% 5% 
Recovery Code 4 2% 11% 
  
For 230 web applications, 12 web applications (5%) used backup codes. 36 web 
applications (overall: 16%, among multistep: 85%) allowed for multistep credential recovery. 14 
web applications (overall: 6%, among multistep: 33%) used help desk or customer service as 
multistep credential recovery. Two web applications out of 230 (overall: 1%, among multistep: 
5%) required multistep credential recovery using a device that was already listed as trusted or 
logged in. 4 web applications (overall: 2%, among multistep: 11%) used only a single recovery 
code. 0 web applications of 230 used Duo’s multistep credential recovery method. 
For 282 web applications,15 web applications (5%) used backup codes. 57 (overall: 20%, 
among multistep: 81%) allowed multistep credential recovery. 22 web applications (overall: 8%, 
among multistep: 31%) used help desk or customer service as multistep credential recovery. 2 
web applications (overall: 1%, among multistep: 3%) required multistep credential recovery using 
a device that was already listed as trusted or logged in. 5 web applications (overall: 2%, among 
multistep: 7%) used only a single recovery code. 13 web applications (overall: 5%, among 
multistep: 20%) used Duo’s multistep credential recovery system 
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CAPTCHA 
The usages of CAPTCHAS, challenge response mechanisms used to prevent automated 
attacks, were measured for the 230 web applications for which we could create an account.  
 
Table 38 
Number of Web Applications for Each Type of CAPTCHA Usage 
CAPTCHA Usage 
Number of Web 
Applications 
Percent  
Percent Among 
CAPTHCA 
Login 10 4% 17% 
Password Recovery 26 11% 43% 
Registration 39 17% 65% 
 
Out of 230 web applications, 60 web applications (26%) web applications used 
CAPTCHA in some form. 10 web applications (230 applications: 4%, among CAPTCHA: 17%) 
used CAPTCHAs during login. 26 (230 applications: 11%, among CAPTCHA: 43%) web 
applications implemented a CAPTCHA in password recovery. 39 web applications (230 
applications: 17%, among CAPTCHA: 65%) used CAPTCHAS for registration.  
Considering all 282 web applications, 69 web applications (25%) of web applications 
used CAPTCHA in some form. 11 web applications (282 applications: 4%, among CAPTCHA: 
16%) of web applications used CAPTCHAs during login. 34 (282 applications: 12%, among 
CAPTCHA: 50%) web applications implemented a CAPTCHA in password recovery. 40 web 
applications (282 applications: 14%, among CAPTCHA: 58%) used CAPTCHAS for registration. 
 
Login and Password Recovery Credentials 
We examine whether the login credentials could be changed. If a login credential that 
cannot be changed is compromised, then an attacker will always have a valid credential for the 
web application and must only find a valid password in order to gain access into the account. On 
the other hand, the attacker could change the login credential and prevent the user from knowing 
the login credential, which can prevent the user from logging into their account.  
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Table 39 
Number of Web Applications that Use Each Type of Login Credential 
Login Credential Usage Number of Web Applications Percent 
Email 197 86% 
Username 61 26% 
Account Number 14 6% 
Phone Number 5 2% 
At Least Two Login Credential Options 44 19% 
 
Based on the 230 accounts that we created, the most common login credential was email 
with 197 web applications (86%) using email as the login credential. 61 web applications (26%) 
used username as the login credential. 14 web applications (6%) used non-changeable account 
numbers to be used for the login credential. Five web applications (2%) allowed the user to login 
given a registered phone number. One web application (0.4%) let a user login given their first 
name, last name, date of birth, and SSN. This web application was the FASFA government web 
application, and thus the web application already knows the date of births, SSN, and name of 
students who are able to have a FASFA. Some web applications allowed a user to use one of 
many credentials in order to login to an account. 44 web applications (19%) allowed a user to use 
one of at least two credentials in order to login. 
166 web applications (72%) gave the user the ability to change the contents of the 
credential for login. Out of the 166 web applications that allow the user to change the login 
credential, 67 web applications (overall: 29%, among login credential change: 40%) required the 
user to authenticate themselves by providing their password in order change the login credential.  
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Table 40 
Number of Web Applications that That Allow Modification of Login Credential 
Changing Login 
Credential 
Number of Web 
Applications 
Percent Overall 
Percent Among 
Credential 
Email 158 69% 82% 
Username 17 7% 25% 
Phone 5 2% 100% 
 
While 166 web applications allow the user to change at least one login credential, 44 web 
applications offer at least two login credential options such as email address and username, 
which explains why the number of web applications in Table 40 do not have a sum of 166. For 
web applications that use username as identity, only 17 (overall: 7%, among username login: 
25%) allowed the username to be changed. For web applications that use email as the login 
credential, 158 web applications (overall: 69%, among email login: 82%) permit the user to 
change their email. 5 web applications (overall: 2%, among phone login: 100%) use phone as a 
login credential and let the user change their phone number. 
Many web applications required some form of credential in order to initiate the password 
recovery process. Hence, we examined the password recovery credential required to initiate 
password recovery.  
 
Table 41 
Types of Credentials that Initiate Password Recovery for Web Applications 
Password Recovery Credential Number of Web Applications Percent 
Uses Email 208 90% 
Email Sufficient 197 86% 
Uses Username 48 21% 
Username Sufficient 43 18% 
Uses Phone 15 7% 
Phone Sufficient 14 18% 
 
Out of 230 web applications, 208 web applications (90%) required at least email as a 
credential to initiate password recovery with 197 web applications (overall: 86%, among email 
initiating recovery: 95%) only requiring email to initiate password recovery. Alternatively, 48 web 
  82 
applications (21%) allowed at least username to be used to initiate password recovery. 43 web 
applications (overall: 18%, among username initiating recovery: 90%) only required a username 
to be used to initiate password recovery. 15 web applications (7%) allowed a phone number to 
initiate password recovery with 14 web applications (overall: 18%, among phone initiating 
recovery: 93%) only requiring a phone number to initiate password recovery. In terms of requiring 
multiple types of credentials to initiate password recovery, 24 web applications (10%) allowed 
email or username, 8 (3%) allowed email or phone, 3 (1%) allowed email or account number, 3 
(1%) allowed username or phone, and 5 (2%) allowed username or account number. For web 
applications that required multiple credentials to initiate password recovery, 7 (3%) required email 
and username while 4 (2%) required email and account number. 
 
Table 42 
Usage of Emails for Login and Password Recovery Practices 
Usage Number of Accounts Percent 
Email for Login and Email Initiates Password Recovery 193 93% 
Email for Login and Email Password Recovery 192 83% 
Email for Login and Only Email Password Recovery 175 76% 
 
We examined the use of email as a sign in credential and usage of password recovery. 
Out of 230 web applications, 190 (83%) web applications used an email as a login credential and 
used email as a credential to initiate the password recovery process. 192 web applications (83%) 
allowed email as a login credential and used an email password recovery process such as 
emailing a reset link and sending a password to the registered email. Specifically examining web 
applications that only allow email password recovery, 175 web applications (76%) used email as 
the login credential. 
Considering all 282 web applications, the most common login credential was email with 
205 web applications (73%) using email as the login credential. web applications (38%) used 
username as the login credential. 15 web applications (5%) used non-changeable account 
numbers to be used for the login credential. Five (2%) of web applications allowed the user to 
login given a registered phone number. Four web applications (1%) let a user login given their 
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first name, last name, date of birth, and SSN. 79 web applications (28%) allowed a user to use 
one of at least two credentials in order to login.  
Since we could not create accounts for the other 52 web applications, we do not report 
on how many of those web applications allow the user to change credentials. We still examined 
the password recovery credential required to initiate password recovery based on the password 
recovery screen for each web application. Out of 282 web applications, 220 web applications 
(78%) required at least email as a credential to initiate password recovery with 208 web 
applications (overall: 74%, among email initiating recovery: 93%) only requiring email to initiate 
password recovery. For username, 85 web applications (30%) allowed at least username to be 
used to initiate password recovery with 79 web applications (overall: 28%, among username 
initiating recovery: 93%) only requiring username to initiate password. 17 web applications (6%) 
allowed a phone number to initiate password recovery with 14 web applications (overall: 18%, 
among phone initiating recovery: 82%) only requiring a phone number to initiate password 
recovery. In terms of requiring multiple options to initiate password recovery, 26 web applications 
(9%) allowed email or username, 8 (3%) allowed email or phone, 3 (1%) allowed email or account 
number, 3 (1%) allowed username or phone, and 6 (2%) allowed username or account number. 
For accounts that required multiple credentials to initiate password recovery, 7 (3%) required 
email and username while 4 (2%) required email and account number. 
For the 282 accounts, we examined using email as the sign in credential and using email 
to initiate password recovery. 193 (68%) web applications used an email as a login credential and 
used email as a credential to initiate the password recovery process. 192 web applications (83%) 
allowed email as a login credential and used an email password recovery process such as 
emailing a reset link and sending a password to the registered email. Specifically examining web 
applications that only allow email password recovery, 175 web applications (76%) used email as 
the login credential. 
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Account Deletion 
The ability to delete or deactivate account can help a user prevent attackers from 
accessing the account or can allow an attacker to deny the user access to the account. We 
collected the ability to delete an account via the user interface for 230 web applications. 85 web 
applications (37%) provided users an explicit method for deleting an account from the user 
interface. We were unable to collect this data for 52 of the 282 web applications because we were 
unable to create those accounts. One possible method for deleting an account involves 
contacting customer support. We did not examine this because an attacker using this method to 
compromise an account involves social engineering and we do not consider social engineering in 
our threat model. Examining the security strength of customer support would require an entirely 
different study. 
 
Storage of Financial Information 
For financial information, we collected data on whether accounts hold financial 
information and allowed the user to change billing and/or shipping addresses. Out of the 282 web 
applications, we collected this data for the 230 web applications for which we could create an 
account. 
 
Table 43 
Number of Web Applications that Store Each Type of Financial Information 
Type of Financial Info Number of Web Applications Percent 
Credit Card 104 45% 
Debit Card 25 11% 
Bank Account 9 4% 
PayPal 16 7% 
 
109 web applications (47%) stored at least one form of financial information on the web 
application. 104 web applications (45%) allow storage of credit cards. 25 web applications (11%) 
allowed storage of debit cards. 9 web applications (4%) allow linking a bank account to the 
account. 16 web applications allow linking a PayPal account to the account.  
  85 
We also checked whether a web application allowed the user to change shipping and 
billing information in order to determine if an attacker can change package destinations by 
changing the shipping information.  
 
Table 44 
Statistics for Address Practices for Web Applications 
Address Statistics Number of Web Applications Percent  
Change Shipping Address 54 24% 
Verify Shipping Address 4 2% 
Change Billing Address 80 35% 
 
54 web applications (24%) allow users to change their shipping address with 4 web 
applications (overall: 2%, among shipping addresses: 7%) verifying whether a shipping address is 
a valid address. 80 web applications (35%) allow a user to store a billing address to the account. 
 
Discussion 
As discussed previously, HTTPS is a useful mechanism for achieving privacy of user 
traffic and for preventing man-in-the-middle attacks. The fact that a majority of web applications 
employ HTTPS on all pages is a positive trend for web application security practices because 
user traffic and their session are protected. On the other hand, only 10% of web applications give 
users direct control of session management, and a majority of web applications allow a user’s 
login session to persist across multiple tabs of the same browser. If an attacker gains access to 
an existing user session and there is no session management, then it can be difficult to revoke an 
attacker’s session on the user’s account. Hence, by not employing proper session management, 
those web applications are facing a major security vulnerability. 
When multistep authentication is implemented, the issue of account recovery for the 
multistep credential arises. Without a proper mechanism to recover a multistep credential, a 
multistep credential that is no longer valid could permanently deny the user access to their 
account. This situation particularly becomes more severe given the case where an attacker 
knows the login credential. Over three quarters of web applications that provide multistep 
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authentication provide some method of multistep credential recovery. One interesting fact is that 
a decent portion of multistep credential recovery involves contacting customer support. The 
difficulty of compromising multistep authentication recovery directly affects the security of primary 
authentication. For future work, analyzing the security of multistep credential recovery processes 
would prove useful. 
Another web application practice that we examined was the presence of CAPTCHAs. 
About 25% of web applications employed a CAPTCHA to in some way in their web application. 
Since CAPTCHAs can help reduce the number of automated and large-scale attacks on 
accounts, it behooves online web applications to utilize a CAPTCHA in either primary or fallback 
authentication. However, the number of web applications using CAPTCHA is relatively small, thus 
a large number of web applications are vulnerable to automated guessing attacks. 
Another source of potential concern is the use of emails as the main form of identity for 
online web application. Email addresses tend to be publicly known, which means that attackers 
do not need to exert much effort in guessing the login credential and can focus more effort on 
guessing the password.  A large amount of web applications gave users the ability to change their 
login credentials. By doing so, users can change their login credential if they suspect that an 
attacker is performing a guessing attack on their account or has even gained access to their 
account. Yet, the attacker can change the login credential to their own personal credential if they 
compromise the account. While only about 29% of web applications authenticated the login 
credential change, it indicates that some web applications are following secure practices. 90% of 
web applications used the registered email address as one of the credentials that can initiate 
password recovery. This combined with the fact that 83% of web applications use email as the 
login credential and can use email to initiate password recover indicates that many web 
applications are susceptible to attackers who can compromise the user’s email account. 
Many web applications do not implement session management, for usage of CAPTCHAs, 
and for login and password recovery credentials, which is may make them vulnerable to various 
attacks. With fewer of these proper security practices in place, an attacker has fewer obstacles in 
place to compromise an account and gain access to the account including sensitive data. Since a 
  87 
portion of web applications allow users to view and change their billing address, an attacker can 
gain sensitive personal data about the attacker or their financial information just by viewing the 
billing address. Furthermore, a quarter of web applications allow a user to change the shipping 
address on their account so an attacker could subtly change the shipping address and redirect 
packages to the attacker’s desired destination instead of the user’s destination. Overall, it is a 
good sign that a portion of web applications are implementing secure practices; however; a large 
majority of web applications do not employ the aforementioned security practices. 
 
Limitations 
We did not examine HTTPS network traffic to determine all requests used HTTPS until 
the final redirect occurred. We assumed that web applications did not only use HTTPS at the end 
of all the redirects as this would be strange practice that defeats the purpose of HTTPS.  
Since we did not fully examine account lockouts and login attempts, we did not 
completely check if CAPTCHAs were used after a certain number of failed login attempts. 
Therefore, our CAPTCHA data is not 100% complete. However, the data we do have still has 
relevance and illustrates the effort by web applications to avoid large-scale guessing attacks for 
mechanisms such as initially logging in, password recovery, and account registration. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Summary 
We performed a survey of the security practices for 282 online web applications for 
various categories. Out of 282 web applications, we created 230 online accounts. Between June 
2016 and April 2017, we examined user registration practices, password policies, multistep 
authentication options, single-sign on options, fallback authentication options, usage of security 
questions, presence of HTTPS, presence of continuous authentication, usage of CAPTCHAs, 
multistep authentication credential recovery, session management practices, and storage of 
financial information. In addition to those examinations, we compared password policy data, user 
traffic, phishing data, and advertising data from the research by Herley and Florencio (2010) to 
the data we collected between 2016 and 2017. 
Our results indicate that a majority of web applications do not take advantage of the 
security mechanisms that can be used to secure online web applications and do not adhere to 
best practices. Password policies for web applications examined in 2010 have increased in 
strength in 2017, password policies are weaker for web applications that profit from user traffic, 
most security questions have issues with usability and guessability, a majority of web applications 
do not follow the recommended password recovery practices, and only a fraction of web 
applications use multistep authentication or continuous authentication. 
However, there is hope for a more secure cyber future. The comparison of password 
policy research by Herley and Florencio (2010) to our data suggests that online web applications 
are making a shift to more secure password policies. Almost every web application category had 
an increase in password policy strength from 2010. The fact that there is a considerable fraction 
of web applications that are implementing multistep authentication and that resources such as 
TwoFactor.org (Davis 2017) suggests that online users are becoming conscious about the need 
for strong security mechanisms. There needs to be push for web application providers to address 
security concerns by providing usability security. As account breaches continue to occur, the 
pressure for web applications to adhere to secure practices will build. While web applications 
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currently do not always implement secure practices, the trends observed in this work suggest that 
there can be an optimistic future were usable security practices are implemented across the 
cyber world. 
 
Future Work 
Because our work covered numerous aspects about web application security, we did not 
cover most security mechanisms extensively. This leaves room for a multitude of avenues for 
future work. For passwords, we noticed that web applications occasionally used password meters 
when registering passwords for an account. A reasonable study would be to examine the 
practices for password meters, the effectiveness of password meters, and develop a 
standardization of password meters. We were unable to project with adequate certainty the 
trends in password practices throughout the years. A formal study into password policy trends 
would prove to be an interesting study. Our correlations between password policy strength and 
presence of multistep authentication and between policy strength and presence of HTTPS led us 
to believe that formal hypotheses for these correlations could produce meaningful results. 
Our classification method for security questions relied on subjective interpretation of the 
guessability, usability, and researchability of some of the security questions. This was a 
consequence of not having a user study to validate the degree to which each question can be 
guessed, configured, and researched. In order to improve our classification method, we 
recommend performing a user study on the guessability, applicability, ephemerality, applicability, 
and researchability of security questions used by online web applications. 
As a part of our future work, we plan to refine our method for assessing a web 
application’s adherence to fallback authentication best practices. In addition, we recommend that 
there be a study of the security and usability of backup codes and other multistep authentication 
credential recovery mechanisms. On a final note, we did not have a chance to examine the 
security of single-sign on mechanisms. Since we found that reasonable number of web 
applications allow single-sign on, we believe that an examination of the usability and security of 
single-sign on mechanism will yield interesting results. 
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AVERAGE AND MEDIAN PASSWORD STRENGTH FOR EACH ACCOUNT CATEGORY 
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Category Median Password 
Strength 
Average Password 
Strength 
Number of 
Accounts 
Airline 28.20264 35.261 11 
Banks and Brokerage 31.01955 36.47735 11 
College 47.63357 43.76181 29 
Computer 26.57542 32.15947 9 
Education 19.93157 21.48566 5 
Email Provider 41.3594 35.9594 11 
Entertainment 19.93157 19.68252 28 
Gaming 33.21928 34.32686 19 
Government 49.03426 55.1718 15 
Health 30.64548 30.64548 2 
Hotels and Motels 37.60352 33.29323 7 
Insurance 23.2535 23.2535 2 
News and Journalism 19.93157 24.39875 19 
Online Shopping 26.57542 28.15667 43 
Real Estate 4.70044 12.45908 5 
Research 19.93157 19.93157 1 
Restaurant 26.57542 30.29015 20 
Social Media 19.93157 20.44263 13 
Software Service 
Provider 
28.20264 32.514 14 
Travel 26.57542 23.4343 9 
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Website Password Strength 
Accept External 
Advertising 
Adwords 
User 
Choice 
Adobe 47.63357 1 1 1 
Amazon 19.93157 1 1 1 
Answers 19.93157 1 0 1 
AOL 45.60352 1 0 1 
Arizona State University 49.5186 0 1 0 
Bank of America 41.3594 0 0 0 
CA Jobs 47.63357 0 0 0 
CapitalONe 41.3594 0 1 0 
Carnegie Mellon University 52.6797 0 0 0 
CBS Sports 13.28771 1 0 1 
Census Harvester 73.79697 0 0 0 
Charles Schwab 31.01955 1 0 0 
Citi Banks 31.01955 1 1 0 
Colubmia University 47.63357 0 0 0 
Cornell University 47.63357 0 0 0 
Craigslist 26.57542 0 0 1 
eBay 31.01955 1 0 1 
Facebook 26.57542 1 0 1 
FASFA ED 49.98342 0 0 0 
Fidelity 47.63357 0 0 0 
Georgia Tech 65.49616 0 0 1 
Google 26.57542 1 0 1 
Hotmail 41.3594 1 0 1 
Internal Revenue Service e-File 48.8682 0 0 0 
Intuit (TurboTax, Mint) 52.6797 1 0 1 
iPhoto 41.3594 1 0 1 
JP Morgan 31.01955 0 0 0 
LA Times 19.93157 1 0 1 
Michigan Institute of Technology 36.18948 1 0 0 
Michigan State University 47.63357 0 0 0 
MySpace 19.93157 1 0 1 
NASA Hurley 71.45036 0 0 0 
National Institute of Health 44.43671 0 0 0 
NOAA Hurley 77.11518 0 0 0 
NOAA Weather.gov 71.45036 0 0 0 
Northwestern University 40.6997 0 0 0 
Ohio State University 43.41012 0 0 0 
OkCupid 13.28771 1 0 1 
Overstock 26.57542 1 1 1 
Paypal 26.57542 1 1 1 
Pennsylvania State University 41.3594 0 0 0 
PGA Tour 19.93157 1 0 1 
Princeton University 65.54589 0 0 0 
Rock Star 41.3594 0 0 1 
SSA 48.8682 0 1 0 
Stanford 52.6797 0 0 0 
Texas A & M 47.63357 0 1 0 
The Weather Channel 19.93157 1 0 1 
TreasuryDirect 49.03426 0 0 0 
Twitter 19.93157 1 0 1 
TypePad 19.93157 0 0 1 
UC Berkeley 53.58777 0 0 0 
University of Central Florida Hurley 49.03426 0 0 0 
University of Florida 47.63357 0 0 0 
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign 47.63357 0 0 0 
University of Minnesota 45.15085 0 0 0 
University of Phoenix 47.63357 1 1 0 
University of Southern Florida 47.63357 0 0 0 
University of Texas 41.3594 0 0 0 
University of Washington 45.60352 0 0 0 
USAJobs 49.3594 0 0 0 
USPS 47.63357 0 1 0 
Vanguard 26.57542 1 1 0 
Veterans Affair 47.63357 0 0 0 
Virginia State University 55.23562 0 0 0 
Wells Fargo 19.93157 1 1 0 
Wikia 13.28771 1 0 1 
Wikipedia.org 3.321928 0 0 1 
Yahoo 46.09474 1 0 1 
YouTube 26.57542 1 0 1 
 
  98 
APPENDIX C 
TYTYPES OF SECUIRTY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS  
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Website 
Name 
Number of 
Fixed 
Question 
Number of 
Open 
Question 
Number of 
Controlled 
Question Add 
Text 
Number of 
Controlled 
Question Hint 
Fixed Answer 
Question 
Open Answer 
Question 
Controlled 
Answer Set 
Controlled 
Answer 
Format 
Activision 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Alibaba 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
American Air. 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
AOL 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Apple 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
Barnes & No. 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Bethesda 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Blizzard 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Buffalo Wild 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
CA Jobs 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Census  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Delta Airlines 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Denny’s 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
EA 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
eBay 3 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 
Facebook 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FASFA ED 3 2 0 0 0 4 0 1 
GMX 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Hawaiian Air 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
Intel 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
IRS e-File 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 
IRS e-Serv 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
Intuit  1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Jet Blue 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Kay Jewelers 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
Mail.com 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Nexon 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 
Olive Garden 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Outback Ste. 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Paypal 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Pizza Hut 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
QVC 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
Rakuten JP 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Rakuten 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Southwest  2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Spirit Airlines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
StackOverfl. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uber 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
USA Today 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
USAJobs 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
USPS 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Virgin Air. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wendy’s 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Wikia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Yahoo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Yelp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Zynga 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Website 
Name 
Edit 
Answer 
Visible 
before 
Typing 
Edit 
Answer 
Visible 
while 
Typing 
Edit 
Answer 
Visible 
after 
Typing 
Edit Show 
Current 
Question 
Enter 
Answer 
Visible 
While 
Typing 
Enter 
Answer 
Visible 
after 
Typing 
Optional 
to Show 
Answer 
Asks for 
Question 
and 
Answer 
Number 
of 
Questions 
Asked 
Cannot 
Use Old 
Answers 
Can Have 
Duplicate 
Questions 
Offline 
Security 
Question 
Recovery 
Online 
Recover 
Security 
Questions 
Advice 
Provided 
Does Not 
Prompt 
Question 
Every 
Time 
Never 
Prompts 
for 
Question 
Activision 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Alibaba 0 1 1 0 null null 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
American 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AOL 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Apple 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Barn. & N 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bethesda 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Blizzard 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Buff. WW 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CA Jobs 0 1 1 0 null null 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Census  0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Delta Air 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Denny’s 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EA 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
eBay 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Facebook 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FASFA ED 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GMX 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Hawaiian 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Intel 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IRS e-File 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IRS e-Ser 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Intuit 0 1 1 1 null null 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Jet Blue  0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kay Jewl. 0 0 0 0 null null 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Mail.com 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nexon 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Olive Gar. 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Outback 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PayPal 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pizza Hut 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
QVC 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
RakutenJP 0 0 0 0 null null 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Rakuten 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Southwest 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spirit Air. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
StackOv, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uber 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
USAToday 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
USAJobs 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
USPS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Virgin Air 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wendy’s 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Wikia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Yahoo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Yelp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Zynga 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
